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INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND 
COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY:  
ATTEMPTS IN CANADA AND JAPAN  
TO ACHIEVE A RECONCILIATION 
WILLIAM A.W. NEILSON* 
ROBERT G. HOWELL** 
SOUICHIROU KOZUKA*** 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The relationship between intellectual property rights (IPRs) and 
competition law has been topical for most of the preceding decade, despite 
the historically separate development of each area.1 This emphasis on the 
relationship between IPRs and competition has forced regulatory agencies to 
adopt guidelines that attempt to reconcile, explain, and illustrate the 
interaction of these areas. At the very least, regulators must provide a 
working basis for practical accommodation between the laws and principles 
of each, though this simply may invoke “a general lack of comprehension, on 
both sides.”2 
Canada,3 Japan,4 and the United States5 have formulated guidelines. The 
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 1. See, e.g., Act Concerning the Prohibition of Private Monopoly and Maintenance of Fair 
Trade, Act No. 54 of 1947, § 21 [hereinafter Antimonopoly Act], reprinted in HIROSHI IYORI & 
AKINORI UESUGI, THE ANTIMONOPOLY LAWS AND POLICIES OF JAPAN app. A, at 387 (1994). A copy 
of the Antimonopoly Act is available at http://www.jftc.go.jp. 
 2. Donald M. Cameron & Jan E. Scott, Intellectual Property Rights and the Competition Act: 
Different Perspectives on Welfare Maximization, in COMPETITION LAW FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 304 
(James B. Musgrove ed., 1998). See also Howard I. Wetston, The Treatment of Intellectual Property 
Rights Under Canadian Competition Law, in PATENT LAW OF CANADA 309 (Gordon F. Henderson et 
al. eds., 1994). 
 3. Canada Competition Bureau, Intellectual Property Enforcement Guidelines (Sept. 21, 2000), 
available at http://strategis.gc.ca/ssg/ct01992e.html [hereinafter IPEGs].  
 4. Japan Fair Trade Comm’n, Guidelines for Patent and Know-How Licensing Agreements 
Under the Antimonopoly Act (July 30, 1999), available at http://www.jftc.go.ip/e-page/guideli/ 
patent99.htm [hereinafter GPLAs]. 
 5. U.S. Dep’t of Justice & Fair Trade Comm’n, Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of 
Intellectual Property (Apr. 6, 1995), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/ 
ipguide.htm [hereinafter U.S. Guidelines]. 
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European Union also has given extensive consideration to the matter.6 In 
addition, in September 1988, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) published an exhaustive report on the issue, 
which included a number of commentaries.7 Two months later, the OECD’s 
Deputy Secretary-General discussed publicly the prospects for international 
rules on competition policy that would bring a measure of international or 
transnational regulation as well as harmonization or comity.8 Arguably, this 
might be viewed as the competition law equivalent to the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property (TRIPs), which stipulates minimum requirements for the protection 
of IPRs.9 
The impetus toward an accommodation between IPRs and competition 
law has come at precisely the same time as the emergence of IPRs as a major 
form of wealth in the information-based economies of developed countries. 
Likewise, the convergence of industrial and communication systems, through 
digitization, has ensured that the use and management of such information is 
of a global dimension. Therefore, the need for an international legal 
framework for not merely intellectual property law, but also competition law, 
is both necessary and likely to develop. 
This Article compares the positions of Canada and Japan on the 
relationship between IPRs and competition law. To do this, we compare the 
nature and scope of each country’s IPRs and competition law, including the 
guidelines each country has issued to facilitate a working relationship 
between the recognition of IPRs and the application of competition law. 
These guidelines reflect the efforts by regulatory agencies to distinguish 
between the existence of IPRs and the use of IPRs. The guidelines focus on 
whether the use of an IPR in particular circumstances is anticompetitive, and 
the solution they provide is compulsory licensing. However, this distinction 
is problematic because part of the exclusivity of an IPR is the right to refuse 
to license.  
The question then becomes: When is the situation one of mere use (i.e. 
 6. See infra text accompanying notes 13-38. 
 7. See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV. (OECD) DIRECTORATE FOR FINANCIAL, 
FISCAL AND ENTERPRISE AFFAIRS, COMMITTEE ON COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY, COMPETITION 
POLICY AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS (Sept. 16, 1998) [hereinafter OECD ROUNDTABLE 
REPORT]. Part I contains “National Contributions.” Part II contains “Other Titles,” which are the 
commentaries of expert participants. 
 8. See Joanna R. Shelton, Competition Policy: What Chance for International Rules?, 1 OECD 
J. COMPETITION L. & POL’Y 37 (1999). 
 9. See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, April 15, 1994, 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS—
RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPs Agreement]. 
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existence) and when is there something more? As will be seen, the Canadian 
guidelines acknowledge that the “something more” requirement can be met if 
the wider circumstances involve a breach of any of the general prohibitions 
contained in the Competition Act.10 However, the Act also envisions (though, 
as yet, without any actual application) that the mere use of an IPR may 
invoke a sanction under Section 32.11  
Likewise, certain decisions in the European Union may be seen as 
essentially requiring mere use. Nevertheless, the decisions have been 
remedial in circumstances where it is suggested that the enforcement or 
“mere use” of the IPR would give a monopoly broader than the proper scope 
of the IPR. These European decisions are discussed below only to provide a 
comparative perspective that may assist in suggesting a potential 
circumstance under which Canada’s Section 32 might be an appropriate 
remedy. This Article does not attempt to provide a detailed analysis of the 
European position. 
Additionally, the 1998 OECD Roundtable, while recognizing IPRs as 
pro-competitive, and endorsing the distinction between existence (i.e. mere 
use) on the one hand, and something more on the other, also concluded that 
in some circumstances IPRs might impinge on competition by being “overly 
broad.”12 
A. Recent Trends in the European Union 
In 1988, the Court of Justice of the European Communities (ECJ), in 
Volvo AB v. Erik Veng, held that a refusal by the holder of an IPR (registered 
design for automobile body panels and spare parts) to license, for a 
reasonable royalty, third parties to produce the panels or parts covered by its 
registered design “cannot itself constitute abuse of a dominant position” 
because a refusal to license is “the substance of [the] exclusive right . . .”13 
This ruling represents the ECJ’s acceptance of the existence/use distinction. 
The holder of the registered design was permitted to retain its monopoly in 
the spare parts market through the exercise of its IPRs. However, the court 
 10. See IPEGs, supra note 3, pt. 1. 
 11. See id. pts. 1, 4, para. 4.2.2 (noting that such circumstances would be “very rare” and only 
“when the conduct cannot be remedied by the relevant IP statute.”). See also infra text accompanying 
notes 192-205.  
 12. See OECD ROUNDTABLE REPORT, supra note 7. 
 13. Case 238/87, Volvo AB v. Erik Veng (U.K.) Ltd., [1988] E.C.R. 6211, [1989] 4 C.M.L.R. 
122. Abuse of a dominant position is a category of competition law infringement under Article 86 of 
the European Community (EC) Treaty. See Treaty Establishing the European Community, Mar. 25, 
1957, art. 82, 298 U.N.T.S. 11. 
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limited its holding by noting that the design holder’s right to monopolize the 
supply of parts incorporating its design fell in this instance within “the very 
subject-matter of [the design right].”14 This suggests a need to consider the 
degree or extent of connection between the IPR and the broader business 
activity. The greater the linkage, the more likely the exercise of the IPR will 
prevail. 
In addition, notwithstanding the design IPR, if the holder were arbitrarily 
to refuse to supply the spare parts, fix prices for the spare parts at an 
unreasonable level, or decide to no longer produce spare parts for a particular 
model of vehicle, many of which are still in circulation, then an abuse of a 
dominant position would occur.15 
Volvo, therefore, provided a precedent for the leading European authority, 
the 1995 Magill proceedings before the ECJ.16 In Magill, television-
broadcasting entities had licensed several sources to publish daily television 
program guides, but had limited publication of weekly program guides to 
specific publishers on an exclusive basis.17 No overall composite schedule of 
all television broadcasters’ weekly programming was available; each 
broadcaster simply published its own schedule.18 The broadcasters claimed 
that they had copyright protection in the schedules, and argued that the 
refusal to license publication of a weekly program schedule to those other 
than exclusive licensees constituted a mere exercise of an IPR.19 However, 
the ECJ found that the broadcasters were abusing a dominant market 
position, and required them to license, on a non-discriminatory basis, third 
parties to publish weekly schedules, including a compiled list of programs 
from all broadcasters.20 
The ECJ reiterated the existence/exercise distinction, finding that the 
refusal to grant a license “cannot in itself” constitute an abuse of a dominant 
position, but that “in exceptional circumstances” the exercise of an IPR might 
constitute an abuse.21 In Magill, the ECJ found an exceptional 
circumstance—the television companies were the exclusive source of the 
basic, or raw, information, and the failure to release this information (rather 
 14. Volvo, 4 C.M.L.R. at 135. 
 15. Id. at 135-36. 
 16. Joined Cases C241/91 & 242/91P, Radio Telefis Eireann v. Comm’n, [1995] 4 C.M.L.R. 718 
[hereinafter Magill]. 
 17. Id. at 726-28.  
 18. Id.  
 19. Id.  
 20. Id. at 731.  
 21. Id. at 790, paras. 49-50. 
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than any schedule) was an abuse of their dominant position.22 
The court also noted other factors in Magill. Programming information on 
a weekly schedule was a different product from the provision of daily 
schedules, so that there was “no actual or potential substitute” for the weekly 
publications of the television broadcasters through their exclusive licensees.23 
In addition, with each television entity publishing its own weekly schedule, 
viewers had no option but to buy each separate television schedule and 
compile them for themselves.24 The court also noted that viewers expressed a 
“specific, constant and regular potential demand” for a comprehensive 
compilation of all weekly schedules.25 
The court held that the television entities’ refusal to provide the necessary 
raw material, in reliance on their copyright, prevented the appearance of a 
comprehensive television schedule for which there was a demand.26 Finally, 
the court found that there was “no justification,” with respect to broadcasting 
or the supply of program guides, for the refusal to supply the information to 
third parties.27 
Magill provides a key example of the relationship between competition 
law and IPRs. First, from a competition law perspective, the circumstances of 
the case enabled an abuse of a dominant position to be established in a 
situation that is prima facie one of mere existence of an IPR. However, from 
an intellectual property perspective, the essential factor was the information 
that would be contained in a program schedule, rather than the schedule 
itself. The third party compulsory licensees were to compile them from 
information they were ordered to disclose. As will be explained, copyright 
does not exist in information or ideas, but in the expression of information.28 
Therefore, there arguably was no breach of any copyright held by the 
television entities, whose dominant position related to the information itself, 
rather than any schedules. 
Why then was this proceeding not decided by denying any violation of an 
IPR? The answer is that the jurisdictional structure of the EC prevented such 
an approach. The existence and scope of any IPR is determined by its 
respective national jurisdiction. Community jurisdiction derives only from 
 22. Id. at 791, paras. 53-54. 
 23. Id. at 790, para. 52. The weekly schedules enabled viewers to “arrange their leisure activities 
for the week” which could not be done merely with daily schedules. 
 24. Id. at 791, para. 53. 
 25. Id. at 791, para. 52. 
 26. Id. at 791, para. 54. 
 27. Id. at 791, para. 55. 
 28. See infra text accompanying notes 93-104. 
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finding an infringement of Community law.29 Furthermore, as discussed 
below, the intellectual property law determination of the existence and scope 
of a copyright in any schedule presented a controversial copyright issue. This 
issue arose because in order to provide the information, the television entities 
would have had to list, set out, or express in some manner the relevant 
information. Any such vehicle of information delivery constitutes a 
copyright-protected form of expression, so that once information was 
supplied it automatically would be subject to copyright through the form of 
expression of delivery. This question concerns the minimum requirements 
necessary to constitute original and copyrightable expression. Is mere writing 
enough, or must it present some creative or qualitative feature?30 
Leaving aside this difficult issue of copyright law, which was correctly 
avoided by the ECJ on jurisdictional grounds, the court has, in the context of 
competition law, provided several factors that indicate the requisite 
“something more” that enables scrutiny under competition law principles. 
Applying these factors, Volvo and Magill are distinguishable. In Volvo, the 
IPR (a registered industrial design) covered the very product (automotive 
panels and parts) for which an abuse of dominant position was claimed. In 
Magill, on the other hand, the product was characterized as information, 
which in itself is well outside the scope of copyright, the relevant IPR. 
The European Commission recently applied the Magill principle in an 
interim measure imposed in IMS Health.31 This proceeding involved a 
similar restraint on the supply of information through the exercise of 
copyright in a data collection and distribution structure that had become so 
pervasive (a “national standard” in Germany) that no data or information of 
this type (information on pharmaceutical sales and prescriptions) could be 
sold through means other than the “national standard” structure.32 The 
 29. Magill, 4 C.M.L.R. at 785-86, 788. The ECJ notes that “in the absence of Community 
standardization or harmonisation of laws, determination of the conditions and procedures for granting 
protection of an intellectual property right is a matter for national rules.” Id. at 790. The court 
continued by noting, therefore, that a “refusal to grant a licence, even if it is the act of an undertaking 
holding a dominant position, cannot in itself constitute abuse of a dominant position.” Id. The court 
then, however, looked more broadly at the “conduct” of the holder of an exclusive right and found that 
such “conduct” “may, in exceptional circumstances, involve abuse of a dominant position,” therefore 
involving breach of an EC law. Id. 
 30. See infra note 92 and accompanying text.  
 31. See Press Release, European Comm’n, Commission Imposes Interim Measures on IMS 
HEALTH in Germany (July 3, 2001), available at http://europa.eu.int. 
 32. The structure for data collection and distribution, the “national standard” in Germany, was 
known as the “1860 brick structure.” Id. The two complainant companies had attempted to sell their 
own regional data in their own structure but “discussions with potential customers showed that data 
presented in another structure was not marketable, because of the pre-eminent position of the 1860 
brick structure within the industry.” Id. The Commission’s own assessment of the industry position 
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Commission concluded that a refusal to license the structure would foreclose 
the informational products market to new entrants and thereby prevent 
competition.33 However, this interim measure was suspended in interlocutory 
proceedings before the President of the Court of First Instance of the 
European Union.34 Although the case would proceed to be heard on its merits 
by the Court of First Instance, the balance of interest did not warrant an 
“interim measures” order against the copyright holder.35 In suspending the 
interim measures, the President of the Court of First Instance commented: 
[T]he inherently exceptional nature of the power to adopt interim 
measures would normally require that conduct whose termination or 
amendment is targeted by such measures fall clearly within the scope 
of the Treaty competition rules. However, the characterisation of the 
refusal to licence at issue in the present proceedings as abusive turns, 
prima facie, on the correctness of the Commission’s interpretation of 
the case-law concerning the scope of the “exceptional circumstances.” 
It is this case law that explains the clearly special situations in which 
the objective pursued by Article 82 EC may prevail over that 
underlying the grant of intellectual property rights. In this context, 
where the abusive nature of the applicant’s conduct is not 
unambiguous having regard to the relevant case-law and where there 
is a tangible risk that it will suffer serious and irreparable harm if 
forced, in the meantime, to license its competitors, the balance of 
interests favours the unimpaired preservation of its copyright until 
judgment in the main action.36 
IMS Health may present another example of a situation where the use of 
an IPR (copyright in the form of expression of a standard structure for data 
collection and distribution) may result in the control or monopolization of the 
supply of information or data itself. For instance, potentially competing 
suppliers might be precluded from supplying information or data if the only 
acceptable format is that covered by someone else’s copyright. Such control 
and monopoly of information itself is beyond the purpose and scope of 
copyright protection.37 The factual situation in IMS Health deserves careful 
supported this conclusion. 
 33. Order of the President of the Court of First Instance, IMS Health Inc. v. Comm’n of the Eur. 
Communities (Oct. 26, 2001), at http://curia.eu.int. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Cf. Magill, 4 C.M.L.R. at 786 (in addition to determining that the television entities were 
seeking a monopoly in information the ECJ also commented, “[t]he [television entities] were thus 
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consideration to determine whether a monopoly in information supply would 
be the consequence of exercising the IPR. 
We present some of the principles propounded by the European Union in 
order to identify themes and trends that provide perspective on the interface 
between intellectual property and competition law. This perspective is from a 
jurisdiction that has provided the most significant judicial consideration of 
this relationship to date. These examples also demonstrate the critical need to 
consider not just IPRs in general, but the nature and scope of the particular 
IPR that is involved in a proceeding. In both Magill and IMS Health the IPR 
involved was copyright—a weak and limited IPR never meant to cover 
things, facts, ideas, or information. It only was intended to cover forms of 
expression. In Volvo, the IPR (a registered design) was intended to protect 
the item itself.38 
To date, no proceeding in Canada has presented dimensions similar to 
those that occurred in the European Union. Nevertheless, the European trend 
presents useful comparative features that must be considered if similar 
circumstances arise in Canada. 
B. Features and Perspectives of IPRs 
The following broad perspectives must be considered in any analysis of 
IPRs and competitiveness in the marketplace: 
(a) Each type or category of IPR is distinct in its nature and scope. The 
conceptual definition and boundaries of each IPR determine the extent 
of any exclusivity or monopoly afforded by that IPR. Naturally, this 
relates directly to the nature of any infringement of the IPR and to the 
availability of competing products in the marketplace. Some IPRs 
afford the holder “strong” protection, or substantial exclusivity. Other 
IPRs provide only “weak” protection, allowing only limited 
exclusivity with greater opportunity for product competition. 
using their copyright . . . as part of the activity of broadcasting in order to secure a monopoly in the 
derivative market of weekly television guides”) (emphasis added). In IMS Health, a refusal to license 
would grant a monopoly in the business of supplying data. See supra text accompanying note 36. 
 38. See Volvo, 4 C.M.L.R. at 135: “It must also be emphasized that the right of the proprietor of a 
protected design to prevent third parties from manufacturing and selling or importing . . . products 
incorporating the design constitutes the very subject-matter of his exclusive right.” See the Opinion of 
the Advocate General in Magill, arguing that the distinction between the existence and exercise of an 
IPR is of no independent significance. 4 C.M.L.R. 752. The essential focus should be to determine 
whether the exercise of rights falls within “the specific subject-matter of an intellectual property right.” 
Id. The Advocate General was prepared to accept that “spare parts” in Volvo were the specific subject 
matter of the IPR (registered design). However, he failed to distinguish the more limited right in the 
nature of copyright in Magill. 
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Therefore, each IPR should be evaluated separately. At present, this is 
of greater significance in Canada than in Japan because Canadian 
competition laws and guidelines encompass almost all categories of 
IPRs.39 The Japanese guidelines, on the other hand, relate only to 
patents and “know how.”40 Nonetheless, there is nothing to suggest 
that in Canada the nature and scope of each category of IPR has 
received individualized examination in an IPR/competition law 
context in the manner that has been suggested; 
(b) In general, IPRs are considered to be pro-competitive because they 
foster and encourage innovation, creation, research, and 
development.41 Patent law theory demonstrates this because it requires 
full public disclosure of the invention, in the interest of the public, but 
with a period of state-guaranteed exclusivity or monopoly in order to 
provide incentives and rewards for innovation.42 As such, the 
limitations of an IPR should reflect the balance between private right 
and public domain. If this balance is not struck in any particular 
category of IPR, then changes should be made to the IPR itself,43 
rather than shifting the balance through an application of competition 
law; 
(c) When considering an IPR’s application, courts should be more 
conscious of the need to consider the appropriate boundary limitation 
of that IPR. It is understood that an item might receive protection 
under more than one category of IPR.44 The broader and more 
significant question is whether an item properly falls within an IPR. 
Allowing an IPR to expand through overly broad interpretation may 
 39. See IPEGs, supra note 3, pt. 2, para. 2.1. 
 40. See GPLAs, supra note 4, pt. 1, para. 3. Paragraph 5 includes definitions relating to the terms 
“patents” and “know-how.”  
 41. See infra text accompanying note 48 (concerning recognition of this policy by the OECD). 
See also IPEGs, supra note 3, pt. 1; GPLAs, supra note 4, pt. 1. 
 42. This principle originated in 1602 with Darcy v. Allen, 11 Coke 84b, 77 Eng. Rep. 1260 (K.B. 
1603), where a distinction was drawn between invention patents and other patents. The principle 
received judicial recognition and was enacted in the exception for patents of invention in Section 6 of 
the Statute of Monopolies (1624 Eng.). See H.G. FOX, THE CANADIAN LAW AND PRACTICE RELATING 
TO LETTERS PATENT FOR INVENTIONS 1-13 (4th ed. 1969). 
 43. For example, if the regular term of patent protection (twenty years from the date of 
registration) is considered to be too long and, therefore, anticompetitive for certain categories of 
products or processes, then a shorter period should be adopted to better reflect the competitive 
incentive a patent brings to that product or process. See infra text accompanying note 61. 
 44. Courts frequently acknowledge this duplication. See, e.g., British Columbia v. Mihaljevic, 
[1989] 26 C.P.R. (3d) 184, 190-92 (B.C.S.C.) (applying both copyright and trademark principles to 
visual depictions). 
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create an overly broad exclusivity or monopoly.45 This is not to 
suggest that an IPR ought not to be interpreted to encompass a new 
product or technology (for example, the recognition of patent rights in 
“higher life” living organisms or the recognition of “business method” 
patents) if such is within the conceptual framework provided by the 
legislature of the particular jurisdiction.46 The feature that ought to be 
avoided is the expansion of an IPR beyond the permissible conceptual 
boundary applicable to that IPR; 
(d) In the Canadian context, the effect of limitations on IPRs imposed 
by related legal principles also should be considered. These limitations 
include: 
 (i) Proceedings for “abuse of the exclusive rights” under a patent as 
provided for in Sections 65-71 of the Patent Act;47 and 
 (ii) A potential of no, or only limited, enforcement of copyright in 
a work or other subject matter (i.e. a neighboring right) that contains 
or presents some measure of illegality. 
C. The 1998 OECD Roundtable 
The OECD Roundtable accepted, and urged competition agencies to 
accept, the distinction between the existence of IPRs and their definition or 
scope on the one hand, and the use of IPRs on the other. However, with the 
need for competition agencies to concentrate on the latter, there was little 
consensus on how this distinction might be drawn.48 This suggests that while 
OECD jurisdictions may agree generally on the primary principle to follow, 
 45. An obvious example of an overextension of an IPR was allowing copyright to exist in a three 
dimensional construction of a two dimensional copyrighted drawing without reflecting that this would 
expand copyright protection to an item or object rather than simply the expression or depiction of that 
item. See, e.g., L.B. (Plastics) Ltd. v. Swish Products Ltd. [1979] R.P.C. 551 (Eng.); British Leyland 
Motor Corp. Ltd. v. Armstrong Patents Co. Ltd., [1986] 2 W.L.R. 400, 1 A11 E.R. 850 (H.L.); 
Bayliner Marine Corp. v. Doral Boats Ltd., [1988] 10 C.P.R. (3d) 289, 297, 306-08 (F.C.A.). This 
matter ultimately required legislative intervention. See the Copyright Amendment Act, R.S.C. 1985, 
ch. 10, § 11 (1988) (Can.), inserting §§ 64 and 64.1 of the Copyright Act. 
 46. With respect to new life forms (“genetically altered non-human mammals”), see President 
and Fellows of Harvard College v. Canada (Commissioner of Patents), [2000] 4 F.C. 528 (F.C.A.). 
There currently is no judicial determination in Canada concerning “business method” patents, but see 
Stephen J. Ferance, Debunking Canada’s Business Method Exclusion from Patentability, 17 C.I.P.R. 
493 (2000). The analysis in both instances is that patents in these subject areas are within the 
conceptual perimeters of patentability in Canada. 
 47. See Patent Act, R.S.C., ch. P-4, §§ 65-71 (2001) (Can.).  
 48. See Executive Summary, OECD ROUNDTABLE REPORT, supra note 7, at 8-9. 
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the application of that principle in particular cases, as well as the recognition 
of secondary principles to determine when such application should occur, is 
likely to present some controversy. 
Nevertheless, in every instance the starting point for the analysis of IPRs 
and competition law is the often-stated description that they present “two 
complementary instruments of government policy.”49 This conclusion 
reflects the economic objective of both areas to promote competition. IPRs 
give a proprietary exclusivity that provides an incentive for competitive 
innovation and development. Competition law, in turn, prevents 
anticompetitive behavior in the marketplace, thereby promoting 
competition.50 A similar characterization acknowledges IPRs as simply a 
variety of private property. Private property never has been seen in itself as 
anticompetitive. Indeed, it is the essential feature of capitalism and free 
market competitiveness.51 Thus, today’s focus on the complementation 
between IPRs and competition law has displaced the traditional perspective 
that IPRs afford monopolies, while competition law restrains or prevents 
monopolies. Such a characterization is now seen to be too superficial.52 
Yet, commentary at the OECD Roundtable recognized that to claim 
complementation between these areas may not be totally accurate.53 The 
degree of complementation may depend upon the level of abstraction 
involved in the comparison. A broad abstraction, as drawn above, may well 
present complementation, but this may diminish under a more narrow 
comparison, especially one that contrasts the short and long term 
consequences of IPRs.54 In the short term, IPRs may tend toward 
anticompetitiveness. However, the increased long-term innovation that IPRs 
afford actually might encourage competition.55  
These ideas must be considered within the scope of each type of IPR, as 
set out below. Although, as the OECD Roundtable noted, the common 
economic characteristics of IPRs are the high fixed costs of production 
(essentially research and development), the relatively low marginal costs of 
reproduction, and the relative ease with which a third party might effect a 
 49. IPEGs, supra note 3, pt. 1. 
 50. See id. pt. 2, para. 2.2. 
 51. See id. pt. 3, paras. 3.1-3.4. 
 52. Willard K. Tom, Background Note, OECD ROUNDTABLE REPORT, supra note 7, at 22. 
 53. See Executive Summary, supra note 48, at 7. “Despite sharing important goals, [IPR] and 
competition policies are not purely complementary policies and managing the interface between them 
can be difficult.” Id. (emphasis added). 
 54. Id. See also Tom, supra note 52, at 22, relying on Nancy T. Gallini & Michael Trebilcock, 
Intellectual Property Rights and Competition Policy: A Framework for Analysis of Economic and 
Legal Issues, OECD ROUNDTABLE REPORT, supra note 7, at 325, 333. 
 55. Executive Summary, supra note 48, at 7. 
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taking, misappropriation, or usurpation of that subject matter.56 IPRs prevent 
such misappropriation. They also prevent short-term competition from third 
parties. However, in most instances, third party competition in the short term 
depends primarily on a usurpation of the innovative features of the original 
product. This is the very usurpation that IPRs are designed to prevent, in the 
interest of longer-term innovation. 
The practical accommodation between IPRs and competition law and 
policy, articulated at the OECD Roundtable, and to some extent reflected in 
the national guidelines, includes: 
  Competition agencies should not presume that IPRs create or 
increase market power, but in certain circumstances IPRs 
might be found to do so. 
  Competition agencies should accept that IPRs are “potentially 
pro-competitive” in nature, even though short-term 
anticompetitiveness might exist. The essence of the pro-
competitiveness is innovation that may flow from the IPRs. 
  Overly broad IPRs might inhibit innovation by discouraging 
or preventing subsequent secondary innovation with respect 
to an invention. They also might increase the likelihood that a 
holder will be found to enjoy a dominant position in the 
marketplace.57 Patent protection is identified in this context 
because patent law regulates biotechnological innovations (an 
industry the OECD Roundtable considers to have many 
overly broad patents) and its claims are the only type of IPR 
with the inherent capacity to be drawn broadly or narrowly. 
From a technical perspective, the drawing of a patent “claim,” 
which determines the breadth of the patent, requires 
considerable skill. If it is drawn too narrowly, subsequent 
inventors can draw their patents around it and destroy its 
economic value. On the other hand, if a claim is drawn 
beyond that disclosed in the patent specification, or so broadly 
that it encompasses a feature within the scope of an earlier 
patent (the “prior art”), or to an extent that the actual product 
or process cannot do or achieve what the claim states (i.e., fail 
a “usefulness” test), then the patent will be invalid. 
 56. See Tom, supra note 52, at 23. 
 57. See Executive Summary, supra note 48, at 7-8. 
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  Competition agencies should not attempt to remedy the 
situation by adjusting or refining the scope of an IPR. Such 
intervention after an IPR has been created would discourage 
innovation. Alternatively, the OECD Roundtable urges 
competition agencies to acquaint patent offices with 
information about the likelihood that anticompetitiveness will 
flow from overly broad patents. Implicitly, the patent office or 
the particular examiner would take such factors into account 
and determine an appropriately competitive breadth for the 
patent.58  
The consensus and commentary of the OECD Roundtable is consistent 
with themes in the Canadian and Japanese guidelines, as well as general 
principles of IPRs. However, only the OECD suggests that patent offices 
should exercise some discretion as to perceived anticompetitiveness from 
“overly broad” patent claims. It is difficult to envision such a role for patent 
offices. The jurisdictional requirements and other criteria for issuing a patent 
involve meeting the essential elements of patentable subject matter (or 
“patentability”) as stipulated in the particular patent legislation.59 The 
preservation of market competition is not one of the criteria stipulated by the 
Patent Examiners. As noted above, a patent claim may be as narrow or as 
broad as permitted by the particular invention and some of the other criteria 
of novelty, usefulness, and the available “prior art.” These are the only 
criteria specified for patent examiners to act upon.60 Giving examiners (or 
any other patent office officer) the authority to assess and evaluate the 
breadth of patent claims beyond the traditional criteria of patentability would 
re-focus the work of patent offices. At a minimum it would involve 
legislative amendments in national jurisdictions. Perhaps modifying the 
“minimum standards” for patentable IPRs under the TRIPs Agreement also 
would be necessary.61  
Additionally, the OECD Roundtable considered whether a patent office 
or a competition agency possesses enough knowledge, skill, and experience 
 58. See id. at 8. 
 59. Essentially, this concerns whether the patent is an “invention” under the particular patent 
legislation. In Canada, the requirements include “novelty,” “inventiveness” or “non-obviousness,” 
“usefulness,” and composition of patentable subject matter. There is no “competitiveness” criterion or 
requirement that must be considered by the Patent Office Examiner. 
 60. See supra text accompanying note 58 and infra text accompanying notes 70-72. 
 61. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 9, arts. 27-31 (providing for patentability upon application of 
the same criteria required in the Patent Act). The TRIPs Agreement does not enable a party to require 
an “anticompetitiveness” test in the patent granting process. 
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to assess competitiveness.62 It concluded that neither entity possesses 
sufficient expertise to “determine optimal patent breadth,” although 
competition agencies may have “a comparative advantage in discovering and 
appreciating the anticompetitive effects” of overly broad patents.63 
Nevertheless, the OECD Roundtable still considered patent offices better 
suited to set a balance between primary and secondary innovation. 
Apart from these difficulties, the term or duration of a patent, or any other 
IPR, provides the crucial balance between primary and secondary innovation 
incentives. Should a particular product warrant a longer or shorter period of 
protection, then national policy makers, together with their international 
counterparts, might decide to change the terms of protection for products or 
processes.  
The issue of overly broad patents will not be easy to resolve. Perhaps 
cooperation or coordination between patent offices and competition agencies 
would enable a pre-grant assessment of competitiveness, or allow a summary 
style evaluation from a competition agency within one year of the patent 
grant.64 This, however, is unlikely to occur. 
D. The Nature and Scope of IPRs 
While most commentaries on the IPR/competition law relationship use 
the expression “intellectual property right,” or IPR, and intend the expression 
to be compendious of protections by way of copyright, trademark (registered 
and unregistered), trade secret, industrial design (or, design patents in the 
United States), and patent, the major emphasis in most circumstances is on 
patent, or contexts principally related to patent protection.65 This probably 
reflects the substantial exclusivity afforded by a patent, even though it lasts 
for only a limited period of time. 
The varying scope of protections afforded by each type of IPR is directly 
related to the impact of IPRs on a competitive marketplace. The scope of any 
protection should include the following: 
 62. Executive Summary, supra note 48, at 8. 
 63. Id. 
 64. A comparison might be drawn between telecommunications deregulation in Canada and the 
issue of jurisdiction between the Canadian Radio-Television Telecommunications Commission 
(CRTC) and the Canadian Competition Bureau. As the industry becomes more deregulated (because of 
the CRTC’s “regulatory guidance”), does it cease to be regulated and therefore subject to general 
competition regulation? See CRTC/Competition Bureau Interface, at http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/SSG/ 
ct01544e.html. 
 65. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 57 concerning overly drawn IPRs (essentially 
referring to patent protection). 
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(i) The conceptual limits of each IPR. For example, does the IPR give 
exclusivity for the item or product itself, or merely for the particular 
form in which an item or idea is presented or utilized? Or, is it 
dependent on external factors, such as continuing public recognition or 
a perceived linkage between the holder and the item (as with, for 
example, the “distinctiveness” of a trademark)?; 
(ii) A formal time limit on exclusivity. To some extent this feature will 
overlap with that of (i), above, if a conceptual requirement (say, a 
public perception of distinctiveness of a trademark) ceases to exist; 
and 
(iii) Territorial limitations on a particular subject matter. This feature 
is significant in global or at least transnational marketplaces. If the 
“relevant market” for competition law purposes is transnational, then 
giving a particular IPR a purely territorial limit may not encourage 
innovation or anticompetitive forces. This would be so whether the 
relevant market was that of the product, or process, or any other 
separate “innovation.” 
II. IPRS IN CANADA AND JAPAN 
A. Canadian IPRs 
This section refers only to those aspects of IPRs that are relevant to the 
interface with competition law.66 Canadian IPRs can be presented in four 
categories of exclusivity: 
(i) First, there are the IPRs that afford the greatest level of exclusivity, 
granting a monopoly in an item, product, or process. These IPRs preclude 
any other person or entity from producing that item or an equivalent item that 
utilizes the same elements of protected practical application. Such IPRs 
include patents and industrial designs. 
In Canada, patent law is under federal constitutional jurisdiction67 and is 
statutory (i.e., subject to judicial interpretation but not involving any 
substantive common law features).68 A patent is granted by the state and is 
limited territorially to the particular jurisdiction. Therefore, a patent grants a 
 66. See Cameron & Scott, supra note 2, at 304-20. For a general survey of intellectual property 
law in Canada, see DAVID VAVER, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW: COPYRIGHT, PATENTS, TRADE-
MARKS (1997). 
 67. Constitution Act, 30 & 31 Vict., ch. 3, § 91(22) (1867) (Can.).  
 68. Patent Act, R.S.C., ch. P-4, § 1 (2001) (Can.).  
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strong and substantial monopoly, but one limited by time and territory. 
The granting of a patent is sometimes described as a “social contract,” 
whereby a state grants exclusivity in exchange for the right to disclose the 
invention publicly upon the expiration of the patent. For this reason, the 
patent “disclosures” must be expressed sufficiently to enable someone 
“skilled in the art” to replicate the item, product, or process after the patent 
expires. 
A patent holder has the exclusive right to make, use, and sell (including 
by importation)69 the patented invention. The subject matter must be novel,70 
inventive (i.e., not an “obvious” development),71 and useful (i.e., it must 
achieve what the patent claims that it will achieve).72 A patent expires twenty 
years after the application is filed.73 
Recent expansions of patent coverage include new technological subject 
matter, such as internet-related “business method” systems and life form 
creations of biotechnology.74 While expanding an IPR to encompass new 
subject matter is not necessarily anticompetitive, expanding it to include 
particular subject matter could contribute to the technology sector’s 
dominance. 
Industrial designs are known as “design patents” in the United States. In 
Canada, they are protected by a distinct federal statute75 under federal 
constitutional jurisdiction.76 A design presents the aesthetic appearance of a 
product. The Industrial Design Act defines “design” or “industrial design” as 
“mean[ing] features of shape, configuration, pattern or ornament and any 
combination of those features that, in a finished article, appeal to and are 
judged solely by the eye.”77 
Industrial design is only protected for ten years from the date of 
 69. Id. § 42. 
 70. See id. § 2. 
 71. Id. § 28.3. 
 72. See id. § 2. 
 73. Id. § 44 (when an application for a patent is filed on or after Oct. 1, 1989). See also id. § 45 
(an application filed before Oct. 1, 1989, expires seventeen years from the date on which the patent is 
issued); An Act to Amend the Patent Act, S.C., ch. 10, § 1 (2001) (Can.) (regarding patents filed prior 
to Oct. 1, 1989, but not expired as of July 12, 2001; these patents now have a minimum term of twenty 
years date the time of filing). 
 74. See supra note 45 and accompanying text. 
 75. Industrial Design Act, R.S.C., ch. I-9 (1985) (Can.).  
 76. See Constitution Act, 30 & 31 Vict., ch. 3, § 91 (1867) (Can.). Constitutional jurisdiction for 
protection of industrial designs is not provided for specifically in the Constitution Act of 1867. 
However, Section 91(2) “trade and commerce” is the appropriate federal legislative context. See 
MacDonald v. Vapor Canada Ltd., [1977] 2 S.C.R. 134, 165-66. But see Pipeline Displays & Fixtures, 
Inc. v. Produits Metalliques J.P., Inc., [1987] 17 C.P.R. (3d) 252, 253 (where counsel raised the issue 
of the constitutionality of the Constitution Act but the court did not discuss it). 
 77. Industrial Design Act § 2. 
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registration,78 but it is still a conceptually strong IPR because exclusivity is 
afforded to the registered design itself. No other person may use the 
registered design even if that person achieved the design by independent 
creation.79 In effect, the exclusivity is in the idea, its depiction, and the 
design. As such, an industrial design is similar to a patent. It is limited to 
Canada’s territory. However, because of the narrow and aesthetic nature of 
this IPR, the scope of any anticompetitive activity concerning its usage is 
limited. 
(ii) Second, the trade secret (or confidential information) IPR affords 
similar exclusivity to patent protection because it encompasses the item or 
idea itself. Indeed, a trade secret can exist in perpetuity, yet it will be lost 
once it is no longer secret. Any licensing of a trade secret, therefore, must be 
subject to a confidentiality agreement. In the common law provinces of 
Canada and the (British) Commonwealth, trade secrets are protected within 
the broad equitable theory “breach of confidence.” In Quebec, Civil Code 
proceedings mirror the breach of confidence proceeding.80 A major limitation 
of the breach of confidence proceeding is that an obligation of confidence is 
established only where the holder of the information imparts or confides the 
information to another in circumstances that reasonably imply an obligation 
of confidentiality.81  
Currently, the proceeding has made only minimal headway toward 
encompassing a nonconsensual “taking” of the information, although reform 
to this effect has been recommended.82 Therefore, while a trade secret IPR 
may provide a monopoly for an item or product that may be important to the 
marketplace, it is still tenuous, depending entirely on the effectiveness of the 
security system that keeps it secret or confidential and the limitation of a 
requisite “relationship.” In Canada, trade secret protection is constitutionally 
under provincial jurisdiction at common law and equity or under the Civil 
Code in Quebec. Uniform legislation across all provinces has been 
 78. Id. § 10(1). 
 79. Id. §§ 9, 11. Contrast this position with that of copyright. See infra text accompanying note 
92. 
 80. See Mistrale Goudreau, Protecting Ideas and Information in Common Law Canada and 
Quebec, 8 INTELL. PROP. J. 189, 205 (David Vaver trans., 1994). 
 81. In Lac Minerals Ltd. v. International Corona Resources Ltd., [1989] 2 S.C.R. 574, 61 D.L.R. 
4th 14, the Supreme Court of Canada adopted the classic English test: (a) the information must have 
the quality of confidence; (b) the information must be imparted where an obligation of confidence 
arises; and (c) there must be an unauthorized use (or misuse) of the information to the detriment of the 
plaintiff. 
 82. See Report on Trade Secrets, Report No. 46 of the Institute of Law Research and Reform 
(July 1986). In the United Kingdom, see the Report of the United Kingdom’s Law Commission, 
Breach of Confidence (Cmnd. 83-88). 
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recommended, but not yet adopted.83 In a technology context, a prime item 
protected by trade secret (and an effective security system) is the source code 
version of computer programs. 
The scope of trade secret protection can be said to merge with a concept 
like that of “unfair competition.”84 This is illustrated by the inclusion within 
secret or confidential subject matters of information that is public, but 
exclusive of “secret” from the act of compilation or collection.85 The 
commercial value of trade secret protection lies in the convenience of its 
availability in one location, efficiently organized. Using the compilation 
without the consent of the compiler saves the time and cost of compiling the 
information oneself. This advantage is termed the “springboard principle,” 
and has been found to exist “even when all the features have been published 
or can be ascertained by actual inspection by any member of the public.”86 
The measure of damage, or the duration of any injunctive restraint, is 
commensurate with negating any unfair advantage that a person has gained 
through utilization in breach of confidence.87 While Canadian common law 
does not yet recognize a formal link between confidence and unfair 
competition, Quebec’s interpretation of the Civil Code does.88 
From a competition theory perspective, the Supreme Court of Canada has 
recognized that trade secret protection creates an incentive to innovate. 
Lamer J. wrote for the Court that confidential information is protected 
because such information “is the product of labour, skill and expenditure, and 
its unauthorized use would undermine productive efforts which ought to be 
encouraged.”89 
 83. See id.; Uniform Law Conference of Canada, Draft Uniform Trade Secrets Act, 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE 70TH ANNUAL MEETING 31 (Aug. 1988). 
 84. This has been clear in the United States since 1993 with the incorporation of trade secret 
protection in the then-new Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition. Prior to this the law of trade 
secrets was reported in the Restatement of Torts § 757 (1939). 
 85. Apart from the information or data itself, a particular method of selecting or arranging a 
compilation or database may qualify as a trade secret, even if it is not “novel” (in a patent sense), as 
long as it is not well known. See Promotivate International Inc. v. Toronto Star Newspapers Ltd., 
[1985], 23 D.L.R. (4th) 196. 
 86. Terrapin Ltd. v. Builders’ Supply Co. (Hayes) Ltd., [1967] R.P.C. 349, 391. This passage 
subsequently was approved by the English Court of Appeal in Seager v. Copydex Ltd., [1967] R.P.C. 
349, 367 (CA). In Canada, see BARRY SOOKMAN, SOOKMAN: COMPUTER, INTERNET AND 
ELECTRONIC COMMERCE LAW ch. 4.9(b) (1989). 
 87. See id. See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 (1995). 
 88. See Quebec Civil Code art. 1457 (Can.) (with effect from January 1, 1994, formerly Article 
1053, Civil Code of Lower Canada, art. 1053, concerning delict or quasi-delict). See also Goudreau, 
supra note 80, at 204 (noting that “unfair competition . . . covers most cases of taking of secrets and 
ideas [with] industry custom and practice often serv[ing] as yardsticks by which to measure the 
unfairness of any conduct.”). 
 89. R. v. Stewart, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 963, 50 D.L.R. 4th 1, 10. 
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However, in contrast to patent law protection, a trade secret (providing it 
is effectively secured) is more likely to affect a monopoly than patent 
protection. This is due to several factors: 
  The absence of a “social contract” of public disclosure in 
exchange for a limited monopoly. 
  The absence of a set time or period of monopoly—a trade 
secret may exist in perpetuity. 
  Without a finite period of exclusivity, the finding of an 
accommodation between long-term (primary) innovation and 
short-term (secondary) or “improvement” innovation, as 
noted earlier with respect to patent protection,90 will be 
difficult, if not impossible. 
  A trade secret, deriving not from a sovereign grant, but 
instead from a judicial recognition of a relationship sufficient 
to constitute “a relationship of confidence,” is not inherently 
limited in its exclusivity or monopoly to the territory of 
origin, but can be enforced in any jurisdiction that is prepared 
to recognize the relationship as worthy of protection. 
  The potential breadth of trade secret protection to incorporate 
merely the collection or compilation of publicly available 
information or data may present some measure of “overly 
inclusive” protection unless appropriately controlled by the 
court. 
In contrast, “compilations” are protected by copyright law, but only as far 
as the selection or arrangement used in the presentation of the information,91 
because these are the only components that are original to the compiler. 
Copyright cannot exist in the facts or information itself because such features 
are not original to the compiler. There is, however, some dispute in Canada 
as to whether copyright protects selection or arrangement established by 
mere effort (“sweat of the brow”), or whether it requires some measure of 
creativity or a qualitative feature.92 
 90. See supra note 42 and accompanying text. 
 91. See Copyright Act, R.S.C., ch. C-42, § 2 (1985) (Can.) (definition of “compilation.”).  
 92. The leading case is Tele-Direct (Publications) Inc. v. Am. Bus. Info., Inc., [1996] 74 C.P.R. 
(3d) 72, affd. [1998] 2 Fed. Ct. 22, 76 C.P.R. (3d) 296, leave to appeal denied [1998] 1 S.C.R. xv, 78 
C.P.R. (3d). Cf. Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 449 U.S. 340 (1991); Edutile, Inc. 
v. Auto. Prot. Ass’n., [2000] 4 F.C. 195. See also ROBERT G. HOWELL ET AL., INTELLECTUAL 
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(iii) Third, copyright affords a substantial duration of protection, 
generally, for the life of the author plus fifty years.93 Nevertheless, copyright 
is a weak IPR because it covers only the form of expression of a subject 
matter that is a literary, dramatic, musical, or artistic depiction of an idea. 
There is no exclusivity in the subject matter or idea itself. The independently 
created expression of the same subject matter will not infringe on an earlier 
copyrighted expression and will be entitled to an independent copyright.94 
Matters protected by copyright include “works” or primary subject matter 
(literary, dramatic, musical, and artistic) and “other subject matter” or matters 
covered by “neighboring rights,” which are secondary and generally derive 
from primary works. These copyrights are protected only to the extent 
expressly stipulated for each category and only for a term of fifty years (i.e. 
there is no reference to the “life” of a creator in the duration).95 In Canada, 
“other subject matter” or neighboring rights include a performer’s 
performance rights,96 the rights of sound recording makers,97 and the rights 
of broadcasters in communication signals.98 
In addition, copyright protects computer programs as literary works.99 
However, the scope of protection is somewhat uncertain when infringement 
moves from being purely literal copying to non-literal copying (i.e., copying 
merely the features of plot, structure and sequence, without copying the 
literal text).100 The greater the scope of protection in a non-literal context, the 
greater the likelihood that protection encroaches upon monopolizing ideas or 
non-copyrightable material. Setting and applying a precise and effective 
demarcation around copyright will prevent such overreaching.  
The relative uncertainty about the proper scope of protection was 
PROPERTY LAW 233-68 (1999); Robert G. Howell, Database Protection and Canadian Laws: State of 
Law as of June 15, 1998, INDUSTRY CANADA, Oct. 1998, at 20-25, available at http://strategis.ic.gc.ca. 
For an interesting analysis of the IPR protection in databases from the perspective of competition 
policy and the sui generis right in data itself provided for in the 1996 European Database Directive, 
96/9/ED of the European Parliament and of the Council of March 11, 1996, on the Legal Protection of 
Databases, see Graham A. Knight, The Fall and Rise of Sweat of the Brow, 13 INTELL. PROP. J. 336 
(1999). 
 93. Copyright Act § 6. The general term of protection is “the life of the author, the remainder of 
the calendar year in which the author dies, and a period of fifty years following the end of that 
calendar year.”  
 94. Id. § 5(1).  
 95. Id. § 23. 
 96. Id. §§ 15, 26. 
 97. Id. § 18. 
 98. Id. § 21. 
 99. Id. § 2 (defining “computer program” as “a set of instructions or statements, expressed, fixed, 
embodied or stored in any manner, that is to be used directly or indirectly in a computer in order to 
bring about a specific result”). 
 100. See generally HOWELL ET AL., supra note 92, at 90-117. 
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illustrated by a divided U.S. Supreme Court in 1996.101 However, Canadian 
courts have followed the decisions of some U.S. appellate courts, which have 
established an appropriate boundary to limit copyright to the form of 
expression, even in the context of non-literal infringement.102 The courts 
attempt to filter or deconstruct a program to identify those portions that 
constitute expression that is original to the copyright claimant, rather than 
that constituting public domain material or commonly utilized procedures or 
sequences. This approach is similar to that described earlier for databases.103 
Thus, a copyright IPR may produce anticompetitive consequences. The 
expression and the matter or idea that is expressed may merge, in the sense 
that there is only one way (or a very limited number of ways) to express a 
matter or idea. Such a circumstance would give a copyright exclusivity in the 
matter, object, or idea itself.104 This may be seen as an IPR that has become 
either “overly broad” or not adequately contained. Beyond this, copyright 
cannot be inherently anticompetitive, and it likely will be the business 
activity itself, to which the copyright is merely incidental, that is the focus of 
any anticompetitive assessment. 
(iv) Fourth, trademarks in Canada may be registered under the federal 
Trade-marks Act105 with respect to particular wares or services, or be 
unregistered. An unregistered trademark is remedial under provincial 
common law or civil law as the tort or delict of passing off (unfair 
competition). In unregistered, and probably all registered, situations, a 
trademark IPR is infringed only if there is a likelihood of public confusion as 
to the source of the wares or services depicting the trademark.106 A 
 101. See Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int’l, Inc., 516 U.S. 233 (only eight of nine Justices 
participated). Justice Stevens is reported to have taken no part in the consideration or decision. The per 
curium result was: “The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit is 
affirmed by an equally divided Court.” 
 102. See, e.g., Delrina Corp. v. Triolet Sys., Inc. [1993] 47 C.P.R. (3d) 1 (Ont. G.D.); Prism Hosp. 
Software, Inc. et al. v. Hosp. Med. Records Inst. et al., [1994] 57 C.P.R. (3d) 129, 269-74, following 
Computer Assoc. Int’l., Inc. v. Altai Inc., 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992). 
 103. See supra notes 89-91 and accompanying text. 
 104. The classic U.S. authority in the merger context is Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879). This 
decision, however, is not prominent in Canadian or Commonwealth jurisprudence. Indeed, the 
Canadian courts rejected this decision in Apple Computer, Inc. v. Mackintosh Computers Ltd., [1990] 
2 S.C.R. 209. Nevertheless, Baker v. Selden is inherent in, and is the background to, any discussion of 
the dichotomy between form of expression and facts. Recently, however, the principle of merger was 
adopted in Canada: “If an idea can be expressed in only one or in a very limited number of ways, then 
copyright of that expression will be refused for it would give the originator of the idea a virtual 
monopoly on the idea. In such a case it is said that the expression merges with the idea and thus is not 
copyrightable.” Delrina, 47 C.P.R. (3d) at 4. 
 105. Trade-marks Act, R.S.C., ch. T-13 (1985) (Can.). 
 106. Traditionally, infringement of registered trademarks in Canada was thought to involve two 
tests: one under Section 19 and the other under Section 20. The context of Section 19 involves a use of 
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trademark, therefore, must be distinctive to the owner of the mark. If a 
trademark ceases to have such distinctiveness, for instance by assignment to 
another party107 or by becoming generic or descriptive of the ware or service 
to which it relates, its exclusivity is lost.108 However, licensing of a 
trademark will not invalidate the trademark through lack of distinctiveness in 
the licensee. This is a consequence of the Trade-marks Act, which stipulates 
that “use, advertisement or display of the trade-mark . . . is deemed always to 
have had, the same effect as such a use, advertisement or display of the trade-
mark . . . by the owner . . .” as long as the owner retains “direct or indirect 
control of the character or quality of the wares or services.”109 
Generally, for trademarks in Canada, any anticompetitive consequence 
appears in the context of parallel importation. There the issue presented 
concerns whether the exclusivity of trademark use should be territorial or 
universal (or at least transnational). In other words, does the exhaustion of 
trademark relief (after its first sale) occur territorially or universally? In the 
context of licensing, the Canadian Federal Court of Appeal has 
acknowledged exhaustion on a universal or transnational basis. The court 
expressly reserved judgment with respect to a territorial assignment of a 
trademark.110 
B. Abuse of Patents and Other IPRs in Canada 
In addition to the conceptual and political limitations on IPRs, all patents 
granted in Canada are subject to “abuse proceedings.” The Attorney General 
exactly the same mark with exactly the same wares or services for which the mark was registered. An 
infringement was found upon simply that usage, without any need to show “confusion.” See Mr. 
Submarine Ltd. v. Amandista Inv. Ltd., [1987] 19 C.P.R. (3d) 3. A proceeding involving Section 20 
(use of a non-identical mark) requires a showing of “confusion” under Section 6. However, in Coca-
Cola Ltd. v. Pardhan, [1999] 85 C.P.R. (3d) 489, 498-99, the court held that the meaning of “use” in 
Section 19 and Section 20 requires “confusion.” Hence, this criterion may now be required for 
infringement under Section 19 as well as Section 20. 
 107. See Wilkinson Sword (Canada) Ltd. v. Arthur Juda, [1966] 59 D.L.R. 2d 418. This classic 
authority points out that, under Canadian trademark law, there cannot be a “deemed” distinctiveness in 
favor of an assignee, even though Section 48 of the Trade-marks Act enables a trademark to be 
transferable separately from the goodwill of the business to which it relates. The assignee must 
advertise or act otherwise in the marketplace to ensure that the trademark is distinctive, and that it 
remains the distinctive belonging of its owner. 
 108. See, e.g., Aladdin Indus., Inc. v. Can. Thermos Prod. Ltd., [1969] 57 C.P.R. 230 (regarding 
use of the expression “Thermos” for flasks). 
 109. Trade-marks Act § 50(1). 
 110. See Smith & Nephew Inc. v. Glen Oak Inc., [1996] 3 F.C. 565 68 C.P.R. (3d) 153, 158-60. 
See also Robert G. Howell, Parallel Importation of Wares and Reputation Spillover: Examples of 
Transnationalization of Law, in ASIA-PACIFIC LEGAL DEV. 84, 94-95 (Douglas M. Johnston & Gerry 
Ferguson eds., 1998).  
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of Canada “or any person interested” may bring these to the Commissioner 
of Patents,111 with appeal to the Federal Court.112 The Commissioner is 
empowered to grant compulsory licenses or even revoke the patent.113 
The Patent Act stipulates the following circumstances as abuses of the 
exclusive rights under a patent: 
if the demand for the patented article in Canada is not being met to an 
adequate extent and on reasonable terms114; 
if, by reason of the refusal of the patentee to grant a license or licenses 
on reasonable terms, the trade or industry of Canada or the trade of 
any person or class of persons trading in Canada, or the establishment 
of any new trade or industry in Canada, is prejudiced, and it is in the 
public interest that a license or licenses should be granted115; 
if any trade or industry in Canada, or any person or class of persons 
engaged therein, is unfairly prejudiced by the conditions attached by 
the patentee, whether before or after the passing of this Act, to the 
purchase, hire, license or use of the patented article or to the using or 
working of the patented process116; or 
if it is shown that the existence of the patent, being a patent for an 
invention relating to a process involving the use of materials not 
protected by the patent or for an invention relating to a substance 
produced by such a process, has been utilized by the patentee so as to 
unfairly prejudice in Canada the manufacture, use or sale of any 
materials.117 
Additionally, when settling the terms of a compulsory license under this 
provision, the Commissioner “shall be guided as far as possible” in this 
deliberation by 
[securing] the widest possible use of the invention in Canada 
consistent with the patentee deriving a reasonable advantage from his 
patent rights; 
 111. Patent Act, R.S.C., ch. P-4, § 65(1) (2001) (Can.). Section 2 defines “Commissioner” as “the 
Commissioner of Patents.” 
 112. Id. § 71. 
 113. Id. § 66. 
 114. Id. § 65(2)(c).  
 115. Id. § 65(2)(d). 
 116. Id. § 65(2)(e).  
 117. Id. § 65(2)(f). 
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[securing] to the patentee the maximum advantage consistent with the 
invention being worked by the licensee at a reasonable profit in 
Canada; and 
[securing] equality of advantage among the several licensees, and for 
this purpose may, on due cause being shown, reduce the royalties or 
other payments accruing to the patentee under any license previously 
granted.118 
The principal focus of these provisions is the failure in Canada to use 
patented inventions, and the adverse impact such failure has on trade and 
industry. These provisions attempt to ensure balance between private and 
public interests, and to prevent the inhibition of innovation that may come 
with the loss of competition. 
In the United States, the courts established the principle of patent abuse or 
misuse. These principles concern situations similar to those that are 
anticompetitive under antitrust or competition law.119 
Other categories of IPRs may, to greater or lesser extents, include some 
principle of “misuse” that is linked closely with infringement of antitrust or 
competition law. However, once beyond the scope of patent law, the 
application of the misuse theory is fledgling.120 To date, Canada has seen 
little movement in this direction. 
C. Illegality and IPR Enforcement in Canada 
In Canada, the Competition Commissioner brings proceedings for 
infringement of the competition law under the Competition Act before the 
Competition Tribunal.121 Private parties cannot initiate Competition Act 
proceedings. A party being sued for an IPR infringement can argue that the 
IPR cannot be enforced if it is “tainted” with illegality by reason of 
infringement of the Competition Act or other relevant law. 
The Canadian position on IPR enforcement and illegality is confused. 
Recent proceedings clarify that copyright can exist and may be enforced, at 
 118. Id. § 66(4)(a)-(c). 
 119. These practices fall into three principal categories: “tying arrangements, improper royalty 
arrangements, and other improper licence restrictions.” David Bender, Interface of Intellectual 
Property and Competition Law: The U.S. Experience, in PATENT LAW OF CANADA supra note 2, at 
323, 330. 
 120. See id. at 336-39. Bender foresees an increasing trend in this direction, especially with 
respect to computer software copyrights. He concludes that attempts to bring more IPRs under an 
“abuse” or “misuse” theory “may ultimately result in it becoming indistinguishable from traditional 
antitrust analysis with its considerations of market power and anticompetitive effects.” Id. at 339. 
 121. See infra text accompanying note 192. 
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least by injunctive means, in a work that is of illegal content by way of 
obscenity, notwithstanding the contrary opinion of the historical and current 
English position.122 However, an early proceeding before the Supreme Court 
of Canada suggests that copyright in a business form would not be enforced 
if such enforcement would further a monopoly alleged to be illegal under 
then existing competition law.123 Similarly, a copyright might not be 
enforced in a work deemed to be illegal due to fraud124 or in a work that is 
itself an infringement of an earlier copyright.125 
Accordingly, the perspective of illegality and IPR enforcement adds a 
dimension to the current analysis that essentially is unresolved and awaits 
judicial determination. 
D. Japanese IPRs 
Various statutes, which fall into three groups, protect intellectual property 
rights in Japan: traditional industrial properties, copyright, and other 
protections. Since the Japanese Fair Trade Commission’s enforcement 
guidelines confine themselves to license agreements of patent and know-
how, other kinds of IPRs are touched upon only briefly in the following text. 
(i) Traditional industrial properties include patents, utility models, 
designs, and trademarks. Statutes on integrated circuit topographies and 
breeders’ rights, enacted only recently, adopt slightly different systems of 
protection. 
First, one who has made an industrially applicable invention can acquire a 
patent by following the procedure provided by the Patent Act.126 An 
“invention” is defined as a “highly advanced creation of technical ideas by 
which a law of nature is utilized.”127 There has been much debate about 
whether computer software qualifies as an invention under this definition. 
The Japanese Patent Office considers computer software to be a mere 
expression of natural law and, therefore, not patentable. Software-related 
 122. See Pasickniak v. Dojacek, [1928] 2 D.L.R. 545; Aldrich v. One Stop Video Ltd., [1987] 13 
B.C.L.R.2d 106. See also Robert G. Howell, Copyright and Obscenity: Should Copyright Regulate 
Content?, 8 INTELL. PROP. J. 139 (1994). 
 123. Underwriters’ Survey Bureau Ltd. v. Massie & Renwick Ltd., [1937] S.C.R. 265, 268. 
 124. This proposition was noted with apparent approval in Pasickniak v. Dojacek, 2 D.L.R. at 554, 
and was expressly left open in Aldrich v. One Stop Video Ltd, 13 B.C.L.R. 2d at 141. 
 125. Compare Compo Co. v. Blue Crest Music Inc., [1980] 1 S.C.R. 357, 374 (suggesting that 
copyright could not subsist in an infringing work) with Redwood Music Ltd. v. Campbell & Co. Ltd., 
[1982] R.P.C. 109, 120 (finding that copyright could exist in an infringing work). See also HOWELL ET 
AL., supra note 92, at 78-80. 
 126. Japan Patent Act, Law No. 121 of 1959, reprinted in 6 EHS Law Bulletin Series Japan SA-
A11 (1966). An updated copy of the Patent Act is available at http://www.jpo.go.jp. 
 
 127. Id. § 2(1).  
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inventions are included in the definition of an “invention” as long as the 
solution expressed in it is related to hardware resources in some way.128 An 
invention concerning a business method, which recently has attracted public 
attention, shall be examined as a software-related invention and is subject to 
the same standard. 
An invention is categorized as “an invention of a product” or “an 
invention of a process.”129 The latter category is subdivided into the 
invention of a manufacturing process and the invention of other kinds of 
processes.130 In any case, an invention is patentable when it satisfies three 
qualifications: industrial applicability, novelty, and the existence of an 
inventive step (nonobviousness).131 Recent increases in biotechnological 
inventions have brought some difficulties with regard to these qualifications. 
Whether there exists an inventive step in it and whether it is industrially 
applicable poses a difficult question, especially in the case of Expressed 
Sequence Tags (ESTs). Such an invention should be patentable only when 
the EST’s function could not have been thought of by a person in the same 
field. 
A patent holder enjoys “an exclusive right to commercially work the 
patented invention.”132 This right comes into force upon registration with the 
Commissioner of the Patent Office133 and expires twenty years from the date 
of application.134 The patent holder can require an injunction135 as well as 
damages against the party that infringes the patent.136 The scope of 
exclusivity is determined on the basis of the statements of the patent claim.137 
However, a recent decision of the Supreme Court, K.K. Tsubakimoto Seiko v. 
THK K.K.,138 adopted the doctrine of equivalence and widened the scope of 
exclusivity to products that are different from the structure stated in the 
patent claim in the following ways: 
 128. The following are examples of solutions that will make the invention patentable: “(i) control 
for hardware resources, or processing with respect to the control; (ii) information processing based on 
the physical or technical properties of an object; (iii) information processing in which hardware 
resources are used.” Japanese Patent Office, Implementing Guidelines for Inventions in Specific Fields 
§ 2.2 1(c)-2 (1997), available at http://www.jpo.go.jp/infoe/sisine.htm. 
 129. Japan Patent Act § 2(3).  
 130. Id.  
 131. Id. § 29.  
 132. Id. § 68.  
 133. Id. § 66(1). 
 134. Id. § 67.  
 135. Id. § 100.  
 136. Id. § 102.  
 137. Id. § 70.  
 138. 52 MINSHŪ 113 (Sup. Ct., 1998) (Japan), excerpted in YUKIO YANAGIDA ET AL., LAW AND 
INVESTMENT IN JAPAN: CASES AND MATERIALS 390 (2d ed. 2000). 
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(1) the elements are not an essential portion of the patented invention; 
(2) the objective of the patented invention can be attained even if the 
elements are replaced with the structures in the accused product . . .; 
(3) a person with ordinary skill in the field of the patented invention 
(the person will be addressed as “one skilled” hereinafter) would have 
readily conceived the interchangeability between the claimed portion 
and the replaced structures in the accused product as of the time of 
exploitation . . .; 
(4) the accused product is novel and would not have been able to be 
conceived by one skilled as of the application time of the patented 
invention; and 
(5) the accused product was not intentionally removed from the 
technical scope of the claim by the applicant during the patent 
prosecution.139 
Second, a utility model is a “creation of technical ideas by which a law of 
nature is utilized.”140 As this definition implies, a utility model is a simpler 
patent. It can be registered with the Commissioner of the Patent Office 
without examination of its substance.141 The registrant is entitled to the 
exclusive right to commercially implement the registered utility model for six 
years from the date of application,142 unless it is challenged.143 
Third, the Design Act defines “design” as a “shape, pattern, color or any 
combination thereof in an article (including part of an article”) that raises a 
sense of beauty visually.144 The creator of a design that is industrially 
applicable can apply to register the design as long as the design is novel and 
could not have been created easily by a person with ordinary knowledge in 
the same field.145 The design is registered with the Commissioner of the 
Patent Office after examination.146 The design right, which is an exclusive 
right to implement the registered design as well as similar ones 
 139. YANAGIDA ET AL., supra note 138, at 391. 
 140. Japan Utility Model Act, Law No. 123 of 1959, § 2(1), available at http://www.ipo.go.jp/ 
shoukaie/utility.htm.  
 141. See id. § 14.  
 142. Id. § 15.  
 143. See id. § 37.  
 144. Japan Design Act, Law No. 125 of 1959, § 2(1), available at http://www.ipo.go.jp/shoukaie/ 
design.htm.  
 145. Id. § 3.  
 146. Id. § 16.  
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commercially,147 comes into force upon registration148 and expires after 
fifteen years.149 
Fourth, the Trademark Act defines a “trademark” as “characters, figures, 
signs, three-dimensional shapes or any combination thereof, or any 
combination thereof with colors” that are used in respect of a product or 
service in the course of trade.150 Anyone can apply to register a trademark 
with the Commissioner of the Patent Office by designating the products or 
services with respect to which the applicant is going to use the trademark.151 
A trademark is registered after examination.152 A trademark right “come[s] 
into force upon registration”153 and expires ten years thereafter, unless it is 
renewed for another ten years.154 The use of a trademark identical with or 
similar to the registered trademark of a product or service identical with or 
similar to the designated product or service violates the Trademark Act.155 
Finally, two other Japanese statutes provide intellectual property rights 
upon registration. The Act Concerning Topographies of Integrated Circuits 
of Semiconductors provides for registration of topographies of integrated 
circuits. It can be registered with the Minister of Economy, Trade and 
Industry. The registrant can enjoin the use of any topography copied from the 
registered topography. The Act on Seeds and Seedlings endows a breeder’s 
right to the breeder of a botanical species upon registration of the species 
with the Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries. 
(ii) Copyright differs from industrial properties. First, the author of a 
“work of authorship” is endowed with rights in connection with the work 
ipso facto, that is, without registration or any other formal procedure. Second, 
the author cannot enforce his right against a work that has been created 
independently, even though the two works look similar.156 
The Copyright Act defines a “work” as a creative expression of ideas or 
sentiments that belong to literature, science, art or music.157 It is noteworthy 
that the list of copyrightable subject matter includes computer programs.158 
 147. Id. § 23.  
 148. Id. § 20(1).  
 149. Id. § 21.  
 150. Japan Trademark Act, Law No. 127 of 1959, § 2(1), available at http://www.ipo.go.jp/ 
shoukaie/shohyo.htm.  
 151. Id. § 3.  
 152. Id. § 14.  
 153. Id. § 18.  
 154. Id. § 19.  
 155. Id. § 37.  
 156. 32 MINSHŪ 1145 (Sup. Ct., Sept. 7, 1978). 
 157. Japan Copyright Act, Law No. 48 of 1970, art. 2(1), available at http://www.cric.or.jp/cric_e/ 
clj/clj.html.  
 
 158. Id. art. 10(1)(ix).  
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Also copyrightable are materials that are creative by reason of the selection 
or arrangement of their contents and databases that are creative by reason of 
the selection or systematic structure of included information.159 
The Copyright Act gives the author moral rights and copyrights. Moral 
rights include the right to make the work public, to display the name of the 
author, and to escape any change to the work.160 These rights are non-
transferable and last as long as the author is alive.161 Copyrights, on the other 
hand, can be transferred wholly or partly, and consist of enumerated 
exclusive rights such as the right to reproduce, to perform publicly, to 
transfer, to lend or to translate.162 They expire fifty years after the author’s 
death.163 
(iii) The Unfair Competition Act enumerates several types of commercial 
torts against which a court can order an injunction or damages.164 The list of 
commercial torts includes the following: 
- to use a mark identical with or similar to the widely recognized mark of 
another party and raise confusion with the business of the latter (passing off); 
- to use a mark identical with or similar to a well known mark of another 
party (dilution); 
- to trade a product that copies the form of another party’s product within 
three years from the time the latter product was first sold; 
- to unfairly use or disclose trade secrets.165 
Know-how is protected under the Unfair Competition Act as a kind of 
trade secret. It is protected from acts of: (a) unfair acquisition, such as theft or 
fraud; (b) acquisition, use, or disclosure of the trade secret with knowledge 
(gross negligence) that it has been acquired unfairly; and (c) use or disclosure 
of the trade secret transmitted by its holder, with the intent to unfairly benefit 
the user or cause damages to its holder.166 The party that suffers or may 
suffer damages (the holder of the trade secret) is entitled to an injunction 
and/or compensation for damages against the tortfeasor.167 
 159. Id. art. 12.  
 160. See id. art. 59.  
 161. Id.  
 162. Id. art. 61.  
 163. Id. art. 51(2).  
 164. Japan Unfair Competition Act, Law No. 47 of 1993. 
 165. Id. art. 2(1).  
 166. Id. art. 2(1)(iv-ix).  
 167. Id. arts. 3-4.  
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III. CANADIAN COMPETITION LAW 
A. Nature and Scope 
Canada’s first competition law dates back to 1889,168 one year before the 
introduction of the U.S. Sherman Act. It was a modest measure, essentially a 
criminal prohibition against agreements or conspiracies that unduly prevent 
or lessen competition (i.e., price fixing or market sharing).169 In 1892, a 
slightly amended version was incorporated into Canada’s criminal code,170 
and in 1910 the first Combines Investigation Act was expanded to cover 
mergers and monopolies.171 A judicially imposed constitutional straitjacket, 
only later removed, thwarted several efforts to decriminalize the 
legislation.172 
Finally, as a result of significant amendments in 1976,173 and then again 
in 1985,174 the present Competition Act175 came into effect, complete with “a 
somewhat paradoxical purposive statement”:176 
 168. An Act for the Prevention and Suppression of Combinations Formed in Restraint of Trade, 
R.S.C., ch. 41 (1889) (Can.). 
 169. This was one of the more polite characterizations of the 1889 Act. At best, it has been 
characterized as a “well-intended but ineffectual gesture.” It was also labeled as a “political sham.” See 
Bliss 1973, quoted in Carman D. Baggaley, Tariffs, Combines and Politics: The Beginning of 
Canadian Competition Policy, 1888-1900, in HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES ON CANADIAN COMPETITION 
POLICY 1 (R.S. Khemani & W.T. Stanbury eds., 1991). 
 170. Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch. 29, (1892) (Can.).  
 171. An Act to Provide for the Investigation of Combines, Monopolies, Trusts and Mergers, S.C., 
ch. 9 (1910) (Can.). See generally Paul K. Gorecki & W.T. Stanbury, The Administration and 
Enforcement of Competition Policy in Canada, 1889 to 1952, in HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES ON 
CANADIAN COMPETITION POLICY, supra note 169, at 65-72. 
 172. For a succinct analysis of the federal government’s bungling of the proposed legislative 
reforms, see Brian R. Cheffins, One Step Forward, Two Steps Back, One Step Forward: Canadian 
Competition Law Reform, 1919 and 1935, in HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES ON CANADIAN COMPETITION 
POLICY, supra note 169, at 162-74. 
 173. An Act to Amend the Combines Investigation Act and the Bank Act and to repeal an Act to 
amend an Act to amend the Combines Investigation Act and the Criminal Code, S.C., ch. 76 (1975) 
(Can.). 
 174. An Act to Provide for the Investigation of Combines, Monopolies, Trusts and Mergers, 
R.S.C., ch. 34 (1985) (Can.). 
 175. Competition Act, R.S.C., ch. C-34 (1985) (Can.). 
 176. C.J. MICHAEL FLAVELL & CHRISTOPHER J. KENT, THE CANADIAN COMPETITION LAW 
HANDBOOK 9 (1997). Flavell and Kent write: “How can one at the same time promote efficiency and 
adaptability of the Canadian economy and ensure that small and medium sized (but not necessarily 
efficient and adaptable) enterprises have an ‘equitable opportunity to participate in the Canadian 
economy’? How can consumers truly be provided with competitive price and product choices when 
the focus of the Act is the promotion of efficiency and adaptability of the Canadian (and not the 
global) economy?” 
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The purpose of this Act is to maintain and encourage competition in 
Canada in order to promote the efficiency and adaptability of the 
Canadian economy, in order to expand opportunities for Canadian 
participation in world markets while at the same time recognizing the 
role of foreign competition in Canada, in order to ensure that small 
and medium-sized enterprises have an equitable opportunity to 
participate in the Canadian economy and in order to provide 
consumers with competitive prices and product choices.177 
In its 1992 Hillsdown Holdings decision, the Competition Tribunal, a 
specialist quasi-judicial agency charged with civil jurisdiction over 
reviewable matters, recognized the conflicting nature of the Act’s 
objectives.178 To the surprise of most observers, the Tribunal declared the 
final purpose listed in Section 1.1, “to provide consumers with competitive 
prices and product choices,” as the Competition Act’s paramount objective, 
even though this particular purpose appears last in the statute without any 
preferential or ranking language. 
Currently, the Competition Act is a comprehensive statute with over one 
hundred sections regarding the regulation of civil and criminal 
anticompetitive behaviors, merger reviews and approvals, and misleading 
representations or deceptive marketing practices. Jurisdiction over consumer 
protection law is shared with the ten provinces under the Canadian 
Constitution.179  
Specific provisions of the Competition Act identify the occasions on 
which the Competition Bureau, under the direction of the Competition 
Commissioner, may investigate a business arrangement, including those 
involving IPRs. As indicated, these cases may involve criminal offenses or 
civil matters. In many cases, the Bureau must establish that the conduct in 
question either “substantially” or “unduly” lessens or prevents competition. 
The act identifies the following commercial behaviors as criminal 
offenses: conspiracy,180 bid rigging,181 price maintenance,182 price 
discrimination and predatory pricing,183 and some kinds of misleading 
 177. Competition Act § 1.1.  
 178. Director of Investigation & Research v. Hillsdown Holdings Ltd., [1992] 41 C.P.R. (3d) 289, 
336-37. 
 179. See William A.W. Neilson, Reflections on Recent Federal Proposals for the Rationalization 
of Trade Practices Regulation in Canada (1992), 21 CAN. BUS. L.J. 70 (1993). 
 180. Competition Act § 45.  
 181. Id. § 47.  
 182. Id. § 61. 
 183. Id. § 50. 
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advertising and related deceptive marketing practices.184 Civil matters, on the 
other hand, involve conduct that generally is interpreted as pro-competitive, 
but that may, in certain situations, yield anticompetitive effects. Thus, 
reviewable matters include some misleading advertising and related 
deceptive marketing practices,185 refusals to deal,186 exclusive dealing, tied 
selling and market restrictions,187 and abuses of a dominant position.188 
The remedial authority of the Competition Tribunal, in the case of 
reviewable (civil) matters, has restricted private property rights. In Director 
of Investigation and Research v. Southam, Inc.,189 the Tribunal ordered 
merging firms to divest themselves of assets, including IPRs, after 
concluding that the newspapers’ proposed merger was likely to lessen or 
prevent competition substantially. In a later case, remedies under the abuse-
of-dominant-position provisions of the Competition Act involved Tribunal 
orders restricting the exercise of IPRs.190 A more detailed examination of the 
interface between IPRs and the Competition Act follows. 
B. Section 32—Powers of the Federal Court to Impair IPRs 
On its face, Section 32 appears to provide the Attorney General with 
strong statutory authority to intervene in a broad range of circumstances to 
remedy an undue lessening or prevention of competition involving the 
exercise of statutory IPRs. The IPRs include patents, trademarks, copyright, 
or registered integrated circuit topography. The provisions bear repeating 
here: 
§ 32(1) In any case where use has been made of the exclusive rights 
and privileges conferred by one or more patents for intervention, by 
one or more trade-marks, by a copyright or by a registered integrated 
circuit topography, so as to 
 (a) limit unduly the facilities for transporting, producing, 
manufacturing, supplying, storing or dealing in any article or 
commodity that may be a subject of trade or commerce, 
 184. Id. § 52-55. 
 185. Id. §§ 74.01-74.19.  
 186. Id. § 75.  
 187. Id. § 77.  
 188. Id. § 79.  
 189. Director of Investigation & Research v. Southam, Inc. et al., [1992] 47 C.P.R. (3d) 240. 
 190. Director of Investigation & Research v. D & B Companies of Canada, Ltd., [1996] 64 C.P.R. 
(3d) 216. 
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 (b) restrain or injure, unduly, trade or commerce in relation to any 
such article or commodity, 
 (c) prevent, limit or lessen, unduly, the manufacture or production 
of any such article or commodity or unreasonably enhance the price 
thereof, or 
 (d) prevent or lessen, unduly, competition in the production, 
manufacture, purchase, barter, sale, transportation or supply of any 
such article or commodity. 
the Federal Court may make one or more of the orders referred to in 
subsection (2) in the circumstances described in that subsection. 
(2) The Federal Court, on an information exhibited by the Attorney 
General of Canada, may, for the purpose of preventing any use in the 
manner defined in subsection (1) of the exclusive rights and privileges 
conferred by any patents for invention, trademarks, copyrights or 
registered integrated circuit topographies relating to or affecting the 
manufacture, use or sale of any article or commodity that may be a 
subject of trade or commerce, make one or more of the following 
orders: 
 (a) declaring void, in whole or in part, any agreement, arrangement 
or license relating to that use; 
 (b) restraining any person from carrying out or exercising any or 
all of the terms or provisions of the agreement, arrangement or license; 
 (c) directing the grant of licenses under any such patent, copyright 
or registered integrated circuit topography to such persons and on such 
terms and conditions as the court may deem proper or, if the grant and 
other remedies under this section would appear insufficient to prevent 
that use, revoking the patent; 
 (d) directing that the registration of a trade-mark in the register of 
trade-marks or the registration of an integrated circuit topography in 
the register of topographies be expunged or amended; and 
 (e) directing that such other acts be done or omitted as the Court 
may deem necessary to prevent any such use. 
(3) No order shall be made under this section that is at variance with 
any treaty, convention, arrangement or engagement with any other 
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country respecting patents, trademarks, copyrights or integrated circuit 
topographies to which Canada is a party.191 
If the Federal Court finds that the IPR holder has used its IPRs and 
privileges to unduly restrain trade or lessen competition, then the court may 
issue a remedial order declaring any agreement or license relating to the 
anticompetitive use void, ordering licensing of the IPR (except for 
trademarks), and/or revoking the right or directing that other things be done 
to prevent anticompetitive use. In practice, only the Attorney General at the 
explicit request of the Competition Bureau would bring a case under Section 
32.192  
Earlier in this Article we noted recent trends in the European Union 
concerning the exercise of an IPR that gives rise to a monopoly interest 
beyond the exclusivity normally encompassed within the particular IPR.193 
We suggested that, if such an additional monopoly were the consequence of 
the exercise of an IPR, then such “mere exercise” could require some 
limitation, and Section 32 might be an appropriate vehicle. To date, no case 
in Canada has presented such a situation. In other words, there has not been a 
scenario similar to that presented in the European cases. The cases that have 
occurred in Canada have involved consequences, or something more, that 
have breached one or more of the general or specifically stipulated provisions 
of the Competition Act. They have not presented any issues involving when 
the mere existence of an IPR might be remedial under Section 32. 
Accordingly, we consider these cases later, in the specific context of the 
Intellectual Property Enforcement Guidelines (IPEGs).194 
In the meantime, it is important to put Section 32 into its historical and 
strategic context. Section 32 predates the 1986 amendments. The origins of 
Section 32 may be placed at the feet, so to speak, of United Shoe Machinery 
Company. By the early 1900s, United Shoe had acquired a dominant position 
through mergers and acquisitions and amassing patents “covering every 
‘shadow of a shade’ of variation in the parts of the many machines used in 
the manufacture of shoes.”195 
In addition to its accumulation of patents, United Shoe reinforced its 
market presence through restrictive leasing practices, including tying 
provisions and the automatic renewal of long-term leases. Following an 
invitation by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council to “cure by 
 191. Competition Act, R.S.C., ch. C-34, § 32 (1985) (Can.). 
 192. IPEGs, supra note 3, § 2.2. 
 193. See supra text accompanying notes 31-38. 
 194. See infra notes 2 -36  and accompanying text. 87 6
 
 195. United States v. United Shoe Machinery Co. of New Jersey, 247 U.S. 32, 87 (1918). 
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legislation” the “evil” of anticompetitive IPR practices,196 Parliament 
included, for the first time in Canadian legislation, provisions in the 1910 Act 
for dealing with combines of persons holding patents who exercise their 
exclusive rights and privileges to restrict competition.197 In those cases where 
patents were used so as “unduly to prevent or limit competition,” the 
Minister, armed with a report of the Board of Investigation that established 
the patent abuse, could take the necessary steps to have the patent revoked.198 
In 1935, the Report of the Royal Commission on Price Spreads sparked 
considerable parliamentary debate over proposed amendments to the Act. 
The amendments would have replaced the competition tests in the patent 
remedy provisions with a broad public interest requirement, creating the 
possibility that the mere existence of IPRs would be subject to the Act. 
Instead, the Act was amended to recognize the exclusivity of IPRs under the 
monopoly and combines provisions of the Act.  
The 1935 amendments (accompanied by strengthened abuse provisions in 
the Patent Act) established the basis for the present Section 32 provisions. 
The proviso stated that the Act’s monopoly and combines provisions “shall 
not be construed or applied so as to limit or impair any right or interest 
derived under the Patent Act, 1935 or under any other statute of Canada.”199 
As a result, the ‘mere exercise’ of IPRs would not attract criminal liability. 
In the postwar period, and certainly until the early 1980s, the provisions 
prohibiting IPR abuse produced very little case law. Many of the cases 
involved prosecutions against companies whose conduct or actions allegedly 
contravened the Act’s antimonopoly provisions. The provisions carried a 
very high standard of proof that required control over a market and detriment 
to the public interest. Rarely could the prosecution meet the standard.  
It was not until 1986 that an abuse-of-dominance provision was put into 
the civilly reviewable part of the Act.200 Meanwhile, the criminal law 
characterization of monopolization was dropped.201 In addition, the IPR 
remedy provisions (the precursors to Section 32), while not technically 
criminal, embodied a similar threshold of anticompetitive effects. The 
similarity of approaches carries through to the present criminal conspiracy 
provisions.202 
 196. United Shoe Machinery Company of Canada v. Brunet, [1909] A.C. 330, 344 (Can.). 
 197. An Act to Provide for the Investigation of Combines, Monopolies, Trusts and Mergers, S.C., 
ch. 9, §22 (1910) (Can.). 
 198. Id.  
 199. The Combines Investigation Act Amendment Act, 1935, S.C., ch. 54 § 2(A) (1935) (Can.). 
 200. See Competition Act, R.S.C., ch. C-34, § 79 (1985) (Can.). 
 201. See id.  
 202. See id. § 45.  
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This brief legislative history places the present Section 32 in its historical 
context and clarifies why the Bureau only will take a case under Section 32 if 
“the alleged competitive harm stems directly from the refusal [to license the 
complainant] and nothing else” and “no appropriate remedy is available 
under the relevant IP statute.”203  
The evidentiary threshold under Section 32 (“undue restraint of trade or 
lessening of competition”) is important to the Bureau’s consideration of 
possible enforcement actions. The Bureau has determined that the threshold 
will be assessed in two steps. 
In the first step, the Bureau establishes that the mere refusal (typically, 
the refusal to license IP) has adversely affected competition to a 
degree that would be considered substantial in a relevant market that is 
different or significantly larger than the subject matter of the IP or the 
products or services which result directly from the exercise of the IP. 
This step is satisfied only by the combination of the following factors: 
(a) the holder of the IP is dominant in the relevant market; and (b) the 
IP is an essential input or resource for firms participating in the 
relevant market, that is, the refusal to allow others to use the IP 
prevents other firms from effectively competing in the relevant 
market. 
In the second step, the Bureau establishes that invoking a special 
remedy against the IP right holder would not adversely alter the 
incentives to invest in research and development in the economy. This 
step is satisfied if the refusal to license the IP is stifling further 
innovation.204 
After working through this analysis, the Bureau declared “that only in 
very rare circumstances would all these factors be satisfied.”205 
C. Other Key Provisions in the Competition Act 
1. Abuse of a Dominant Position 
Sections 78 and 79 of the Competition Act govern the evaluation of 
restrictive practices engaged in by dominant firms. The Act requires three 
specific elements of proof: (1) that the firm(s) involved completely or 
substantially control a class or species of business; (2) that the firm(s) have 
 203. IPEGs, supra note 3, § 4.2.2. 
 204. Id.  
 
 205. Id. For an example of such a case, see infra Case No. 10. 
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engaged in a practice of anticompetitive acts; and (3) that the practice of 
anticompetitive acts has had the effect of substantially lessening 
competition.206 
Section 79(4) directs the Competition Tribunal to consider whether an 
anticompetitive practice is the result of superior performance.207 Section 78 
provides a non-exhaustive list of possible anticompetitive acts that may be 
considered when applying Section 79.208 For example, the list includes 
“requiring or inducing a supplier to sell primarily to certain customers.”209 
Given the fact that the list is not exhaustive, Section 79 potentially is 
applicable to a broad range of IPR licensing practices such as exclusive 
purchasing restrictions, field-of-use restrictions, and tie-ins. 
At the same time, Section 79(5) contains a limited exception for the 
exercise of IPRs, stipulating that acts engaged in “pursuant only to the 
exercise of any right or the enjoyment of any interest” derived under 
intellectual property statutes are not anticompetitive acts for the purpose of 
the abuse provisions.210 Note, however, that the text of the exception does not 
provide a blanket exception for intellectual property holders from the 
application of Section 79.211 Thus, the interpretation is left open that the Act 
will apply to practices that are shown to amount to the abuse of an IPR, not 
just an IPR’s mere exercise.  
In NutraSweet, the Competition Tribunal found that NutraSweet’s 
protection of its trademark (the swirl logo), its exclusive supply and use 
clauses, its meet-or-release clauses, its cooperative marketing allowances and 
its most-favored-nation clauses constituted “anticompetitive acts” under 
Section 79.212 The Tribunal found that trademark allowances and advertising 
discounts created an all-or-nothing choice for customers and were essentially 
inducements to exclusivity.213 The Tribunal also decided that the use of 
NutraSweet’s U.S. patent to secure a competitive advantage in Canada was 
an anticompetitive act. The Tribunal viewed NutraSweet’s marketing 
strategy as an attempt to extend the life of its Canadian patent beyond its 
statutory term of protection. Specifically, the Tribunal refused to accept that 
NutraSweet “is entitled to any more protection against competition than it 
was able to obtain through patent grants that provided it with a considerable 
 206. Competition Act, R.S.C., ch. C-34, § 79(1) (1985) (Can.). 
 207. Id. § 79(4).  
 208. Id. § 78. 
 209. Id. § 78(h).  
 210. Id. § 79(5).  
 211. See id.  
 212. Director of Investigation & Research v. NutraSweet Co., [1990] 32 C.P.R. (3d) 1. 
 213. Id. at 41-42. 
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head start on potential competitors.”214 This observation, in the words of a 
former Competition Commissioner,215 suggests that “the Tribunal is prepared 
to address attempts to artificially extend the duration or scope of patent rights 
through contractual or like means, in cases under the abuse provisions.”216 
Foreign IPRs and the use of such rights to lever the position of a 
dominant firm in the Canadian market are open to review under Section 79. 
NutraSweet, for example, offered rebates on exports of its artificial sweetener 
from the United States in an effort to persuade importers to exclusively use 
its sweetener in products produced by them in Canada. The Tribunal’s 
remedial orders prohibited NutraSweet from agreeing to or enforcing 
contractual terms relating to exclusivity of supply or use of financial 
inducements for trademark display or other allowances, meet-or-release 
clauses, and most-favored-nation clauses, unless such clauses also were 
found in supply contracts between NutraSweet and any competitor. 
NutraSweet confirms that the Tribunal will treat IPRs in the same way as any 
other type of property right when dominant firms promote their abuse.217 
In Tele-Direct, the same Tribunal held that the selective refusal to license 
a trademark did not constitute an anticompetitive act.218 Section 79(5) makes 
it clear that something more than the mere exercise of statutory rights, even if 
exclusionary in effect, must be present before there will be a finding of 
misuse of a statutory IPR. 
In Tele-Direct, the Director (now called the Competition Commissioner) 
alleged that Tele-Direct, a telephone directory publisher, had breached 
Section 79 by refusing to license its yellow pages and walking fingers logo to 
competing suppliers of telephone directory advertising services.219 The 
Tribunal recognized the implications of the Trade-Marks Act, which allows 
trademark holders to decide to whom and under what terms they will license 
their trademarks.220 The Tribunal also acknowledged that a trademark might 
be misused by tying a trademarked product to another product.221 However, 
in a rather unsatisfactory decision, the Tribunal failed to identify the criteria 
that must be satisfied before it would find that conduct extends beyond the 
 214. Id. at 52. 
 215. The Competition Commissioner is the new title given to the office formerly known as the 
Director of Investigation and Research.  
 216. Wetston, supra note 2, at 309, 315. 
 217. See Donald N. Thompson, NutraSweet: The Evolution of Law on Abuse of Dominant 
Position, 18 CAN. BUS. L.J. 17 (1991) (further discussing the NutraSweet decision). 
 218. Director of Investigation & Research v. Tele-Direct (Publications), Inc., [1997] 73 C.P.R. 
(3d) 1, 32. 
 219. Id. at 30.  
 220. Id. at 30-31.  
 221. Id. at 31.  
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mere exercise of statutory rights exempted under subsection 79(5). Rather, 
the Tribunal found that Tele-Direct’s “refusal to license their trademarks falls 
squarely within [their] prerogative . . . to determine whether or not, and to 
whom, to grant a license; selectivity in licensing is fundamental to the 
rationale behind protecting trademarks.”222  
However, in two consent order cases, the Tribunal dealt differently with 
trademark licensing by dominant firms. In the Interac case,223 the Tribunal 
did order the licensing of trademarks held by charter members of an 
electronic banking network upon “commercially reasonable terms without 
charge upon request to any member participating in the shared services that 
used the trademarks.” The bankers’ network refused network membership to 
financial institutions, including credit unions, thereby maintaining control of 
shared electronic financial services.224 Similarly, in the AGT Directory 
case,225 the Tribunal’s consent order prohibited the trademark holders from 
refusing to license their ‘Yellow Pages’ trademarks to other companies for 
use in the sale of advertising and telephone directories “provided that these 
companies enter into and maintain a commercially reasonable standard form 
of trademark licensing agreement.”226 
2. Price Maintenance 
Price maintenance is a criminal offense under the Competition Act. 
Section 61 contains a “no exemption” clause for IPR holders, so that if they 
attempt to influence prices in the downstream market they may be held 
criminally liable.227 Under this provision, no person having such rights and 
privileges may “attempt to influence upward, or discourage the reduction of, 
the price at which” products are sold in Canada.228 Section 61 also prohibits 
these persons from “refus[ing] to supply a product to or otherwise 
discriminat[ing] against any other person engaged in business in Canada 
because of the low pricing policy of that other person.”229 The result of this 
provision is to prohibit the use of price maintenance clauses in patent or other 
licensing agreements.230 
 222. Id. at 32.  
 223. Director of Investigation and Research v. Bank of Montreal, [1996] 68 C.P.R. (3d) 527. 
 224. Id.  
 225. Id. at 535-36.  
 226. Director of Investigation & Research v. AGT Directory Ltd., [1994] Can. Comp. Trib. Dec. 
No. 24, Trib. Dec. No. CT9402/19. 
 227. Competition Act, R.S.C., ch. C-34, § 61(9) (1985) (Can.). 
 228. Id. § 61(1)(a).  
 229. Id. § 61(1)(b).  
 230. See Wetston, supra note 2 (discussing whether the strict treatment of price maintenance from 
 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p323 Neilson book pages.doc  10/15/02  11:51 AM 
 
 
 
 
 
362   WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 1:323 
 
 
 
 
 
3. Restrictive Licensing Practices 
Section 77 deals specifically with the practices of tied selling, exclusive 
dealing, and territorial market restrictions.231 Although it does not refer 
specifically to IPRs, the provision is applicable to anticompetitive licensing 
practices. These are not per se offenses, as they are in price maintenance 
situations.232 Instead, Section 77 applies only where the practices in question 
are likely to result in a substantial lessening of competition.233 Thus, Section 
77 recognizes the now familiar argument that vertical market restraints are 
not always anticompetitive. 
Tying occurs when a seller offers one product or service (the tying 
product) on the condition that the buyer also purchases one or more other 
products or services (the tied product). Such cases raise two issues for 
competition policy. First, tying leverages the tying product’s market power 
onto the tied product. Second, tying can increase barriers to entry to the 
supply of the tied product. The open question for interpretation under Section 
77 is whether IPRs lead to a presumption of market power. Section 77(2) 
provides: 
Where, on application by the Director, the Tribunal finds that 
exclusive dealing or tied selling because it is engaged in by a major 
supplier of a product in a market or because it is widespread in a 
market, is likely to 
(a) impede entry into or expansion of a firm in the market, 
(b) impede introduction of a product into or expansion of sales of a 
product in the market, or 
(c) have any other exclusionary effect in the market, 
with the result that competition is or is likely to be lessened 
substantially, the Tribunal may make an order . . . 234 
Assuming that the Tribunal will not follow the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
decision in U.S. v. Loew’s, which presumed that an IPR holder is 
automatically “a major supplier of a product in a market,”235 it will be up to 
an economics point of view is appropriate). Although Section 61 was amended in 1999, its language in 
this respect has not been altered. 
 231. Competition Act § 77(2).  
 232. See id. § 61. 
 233. Id. § 77(2).  
 234. Id. (emphasis added).  
 235. U.S. v. Loew’s, Inc., 371 U.S. 38 (1962). 
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the prosecutor to show that the protected product has no close substitutes and 
therefore occupies a market unto itself.236 
Finally, Section 77 has several important objections uniquely relating to 
tying arrangements, particularly its exemption of arrangements between 
affiliated parties (the so-called ‘Canadian Tire Franchise stores amendment’), 
preventing the application of Tribunal orders with respect to exclusive 
dealing, market restrictions, or tied selling to multiple product ‘franchise 
operations.’237 
4. Specialization Agreements 
Section 86(4) deals with specialization agreements. 
[It] provides for a specific exemption from scrutiny under section 45 
(conspiracies) and section 77 (exclusive dealing) for agreements 
which, for example, ration output so that firms may meet international 
competition more effectively, or that involve cross-licensing or 
pooling of patents. The latter agreements must receive the approval of 
the Tribunal, which may require wide-spread licensing of the patents 
throughout the industry as a condition for the registration of a 
specialisation agreement.238 
5. Refusal to Deal 
A successful application under Section 75 requires that the Bureau show 
that a firm is substantially affected in its business because it is denied supply 
 236. S. Globerman & R. Schwindt, Intellectual Property Rights: Anticompetitive Abuses and 
Competition Policy Antidotes, in CANADIAN COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY AT THE CENTENARY 489 
(R.S. Khemani & W.T. Stanbury eds., 1991). 
 237. Competition Act § 77(4). It provides, inter alia, that “no order made under this section 
applies in respect of exclusive dealing, market restriction or tied selling between or among companies, 
partnerships and sole proprietorships that are affiliated.” Id. (emphasis added). By Section 77(5), “a 
company . . . is affiliated with another company . . . in respect of any agreement between them 
whereby one party grants to the other party the right to use a trade-mark or trade-name to identify the 
business of the grantee, if 
(i) the business is related to the sale or distribution, pursuant to a marketing plan or system 
prescribed substantially by the grantor, of a multiplicity of products obtained from competing 
sources of supply and a multiplicity of suppliers, and 
(ii) no one product dominates the business. 
Id. § 77(5) (emphasis added). 
 238. See Gallini & Trebilcock, supra note 54, at 333. 
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of a product, “the product is in ample supply,” and it is willing “to meet the 
usual trade terms.”239 Section 75 provides the following defense: 
For the purposes of this section, an article is not a separate product in a 
market only because it is differentiated from other articles in its class 
by a trademark, proprietary name or the like, unless the article so 
differentiated occupies such a dominant position in the market as to 
substantially affect the ability of a person to carry on business . . .240 
On the face of the Competition Act, it appears that a trademark article 
itself cannot be the market unless it holds a dominant position. Following the 
Chrysler decision,241 in matters of trademark, the Tribunal will not accept a 
presumption of market power for the purposes of the refusal to deal 
provisions of the Act. The appropriate test, in the Tribunal’s view, is the 
availability of acceptable substitutes.242 In its more recent decision in Warner 
Music Canada, the Tribunal concluded that copyright licenses are not 
“products” within the meaning of the refusal to deal provisions of the Act.243 
This surprised some observers because it had been thought that IP, as a 
species of personal property, would be considered a “product” within the 
meaning of the Act, and therefore subject in the same way that U.S. 
authorities consider intellectual property to be subject to U.S. antitrust law.244  
The Canadian Guidelines, which were released post-Warner, declared 
that “the Competition Act generally applies to conduct involving IP as it 
applies to conduct involving other forms of property.”245 It defines “IP 
rights” as, inter alia, including “rights granted under the Copyright Act.”246 
Interestingly, the Guidelines make no reference to Warner’s treatment of 
copyright as a property issue. Nor are copyright IPRs cited in any of the ten 
“Hypothetical Examples” found in Part 7 of the Canadian Guidelines. 
6. Price Discrimination 
Canada has long recognized the potential use of IPRs to strengthen 
international price discrimination. In its 1971 Report on Intellectual and 
 239. Competition Act § 75(1).  
 240. Id. § 75(2).  
 241. Director of Investigation & Research v. Chrysler Canada Ltd., [1989] 27 C.P.R. (3d) 1 
(defining the product market as “Chrysler autoparts.”). 
 242. Globerman & Schwindt, supra note 236, at 491. 
 243. Director of Investigation & Research v. Warner Music Canada Ltd., [1997] 78 C.P.R. (3d) 
321. 
 244. U.S. Guidelines, supra note 5, § 2.0. 
 245. IPEGs, supra note 3, pt. 1 (emphasis added). 
 246. Id. § 2.1. 
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Industrial Property, the Economic Council declared, 
The patent right should be so defined that neither the holder of a 
Canadian patent nor any licensee thereunder should have the right to 
prevent the importation into Canada by any person of the patented 
article, or an article made by the patented process, from other 
countries where the article or process enjoys patent protection. The 
main purpose of this recommendation would be to prevent a patentee 
from using the Canadian patent system as a means of assisting any 
international price discrimination to Canada’s disadvantage . . . .247 
The same report made similar suggestions with respect to industrial 
design, trademark, and, to a lesser extent, copyright. However, these 
recommendations have not, for the most part, been acted upon.248 
While in certain circumstances IPRs can be used to support the IPR 
holder’s international price discrimination strategy, 
[i]t is unlikely that the property right commonly plays a critical role in 
such a strategy for the simple reason that the discriminator usually has 
better strategic alternatives. The best of these is the use of vertical 
restraints in the distribution system.249 
As a result, multinationals usually place territorial restrictions on sales by 
their foreign subsidiaries. In those relatively rare cases where such 
restrictions are evaded (by a variety of means and persons), Canadian 
jurisprudence must be considered. 
7. Mergers 
Sections 91 through 104 deal exclusively with the merger of intellectual 
property assets. To date, there are no reported cases that have been brought 
under the merger provisions. Nevertheless, two cases confirm that the merger 
provisions will be applied to IPRs involved in corporate takeovers or 
mergers. 
In Southam,250 the Competition Bureau alleged that Southam’s 
acquisitions of community newspapers in the Lower Mainland of British 
Columbia substantially lessened competition.251 The Tribunal’s order called 
 247. ECONOMIC COUNCIL OF CANADA, REPORT ON INTELLECTUAL AND INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY 
90 (1971). 
 248. Globerman & Schwindt, supra note 236, at 473. 
 249. Id. at 477. 
 250. Southam, 47 C.P.R. 240. 
 251. Id.  
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for the divestiture, at Southam’s option, of either one suburban weekly 
newspaper or the specialist Real Estate Weekly newspapers.252 The order in 
this case involved assets of a newspaper business that included the copyrights 
in the newspapers as well as the trademarks associated with the newspapers’ 
operations. 
Divestiture remedy in most cases must involve the transfer, sale, or other 
release of IP assets owned by one or both of the merging companies. Armed 
with this authority, the Bureau negotiated significant amendments to IP 
licensing agreements as the price of approving the takeover of Carnaud 
Metalbox, S.A. by Crown Cork & Seal Inc.253 The 1996 merger “integrated 
the only two significant suppliers for Canadian manufacturers of food and 
drinks that use metal vacuum closures as an input.”254 The closures were so 
unique that no substitute was considered available.255 Thus, the closures 
became the relevant product market. In the Director’s opinion, the merger 
would lock up the Canadian market by “about 99%.”256 The only possible 
U.S.-based competitor, White Cap, was barred from the Canadian market by 
reason of its exclusive IP licensing agreement with Crown. In the Director’s 
view, “the likely effects of the exclusivity clause contained in the licensing 
agreement combined with Crown’s continued use of White Cap closure 
technology, trade secrets, patents and trademarks resulted in a substantial 
lessening of competition.”257 
After several months of negotiation, Crown agreed to make the license 
non-exclusive, thereby removing the barrier to White Cap’s ability to 
compete in the Canadian market.258 For its part, Crown settled the issue of 
remaining rights under the licensing agreement through a paid-up non-
exclusive license to use existing White Cap technology pending its adoption 
of another proprietary metal vacuum closure technology.259 Crown also 
waived its rights to use White Cap’s future technology, trade secrets, and 
other IPRs.260 
 252. Id.  
 253. Competition Bureau Staff, Amendment to Licensing Agreement Resolves Competition 
Concerns on Intellectual Property Rights and Ancillary Rights following Merger between Carnand 
Metalbox, S.A. and Crown Cork and Seal, Inc., 8 CAN. COMPETITION RECORD 26-27 (1997). 
 254. Id. at 26.  
 255. Id.  
 256. Id. at 27.  
 257. Id. 
 258. Id.  
 259. Id.  
 260. Id.  
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This case is consistent with the approach taken by the Competition 
Commissioner in the Merger Enforcement Guidelines (MEGs), which state 
that IP assets are to be treated in the same manner as other assets.261 
8. Complaints and Challenges 
A licensee choosing to challenge a potential abuse of IPRs can do so 
directly under the Patent Act. Under the Competition Act, complaints in most 
cases are made directly to the Competition Bureau. Section 36 of the 
Competition Act grants a private right of action for violations of the criminal 
provisions. Criminal offenses, as noted, include conspiracy, bid rigging, price 
maintenance, price discrimination, predatory pricing, and some types of 
misleading advertising and related deceptive marketing practices.262 
IV. JAPANESE COMPETITION LAW 
The Antimonopoly Act is the principal statutory instrument of Japanese 
competition law. Its enforcement is entrusted to an independent 
governmental agency, the Fair Trade Commission. The Antimonopoly Act 
regulates anticompetitive acts and market concentration. It prohibits three 
kinds of anticompetitive acts: private monopolization, unreasonable restraints 
of trade, and unfair trade practices. 
Private monopolization is an act that “excludes or controls the business 
activities of other entrepreneurs, thereby causing . . . a substantial restraint of 
competition in any particular field of trade.”263 If a company engages in this 
type of anticompetitive act, the Fair Trade Commission will issue a cease and 
desist order264 and those engaged will be subject to penal sanctions.265 
Infringement of this provision constitutes a tort, and the enterprise shall 
compensate for the resulting damage.266 When the cease and desist order 
becomes conclusive, the enterprise cannot be exempted, even by proving it 
has never been negligent.267 
An unreasonable restraint of trade is a concerted action such as a cartel 
that causes “a substantial restraint of competition in any particular field of 
 261. Canada Competition Bureau, Merger Enforcement Guidelines § 1 (Mar. 1991), available at 
http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/SSG/ct01026e.html [hereinafter MEGs]. 
 262. Competition Act, R.S.C., ch. C-34, pt. VI (1985) (Can.). 
 263. Antimonopoly Act § 2(5). 
 264. Id. § 7(1).  
 265. Id. § 89. 
 266. Id. § 25.  
 267. Id. § 26.  
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trade.”268 When an enterprise commits an unreasonable restraint of trade, it 
shall be subject to an order of the Fair Trade Commission to pay a 
“surcharge” to the Treasury, as a kind of disgorgement, in addition to the 
normal cease and desist order and civil liability.269 The amount of the 
surcharge is 6% of the sales that the enterprise has earned while engaging in 
the unreasonable restraint of trade (if this period exceeds three years, then it 
is 6% of the sales amount for the last three years).270 Those engaged are, as in 
the case of the private monopolization, subject to penal sanctions.271 
Categories of unfair trade practices are to be articulated by the Fair Trade 
Commission.272 To date, the Commission has designated sixteen kinds of 
acts in its Notification of 1982.273 They are: 
  concerted refusals to deal; 
  other types of refusals to deal; 
  discriminatory pricing; 
  discriminatory treatment on transaction terms or the like; 
  discriminatory treatment in a trade association; 
  sales at unfairly low prices; 
  purchases at unjustly high prices; 
  deceptive customer inducement; 
  customer inducement by unjust benefits; 
  tie-in sales; 
  dealing on exclusive terms; 
  resale price restrictions; 
  dealing on restrictive terms; 
  abuse of a dominant bargaining position; 
  interference with a competitor’s transaction; 
 268. Id. § 2(6).  
 269. Id. § 7-2.  
 270. Id.  
 271. Id. § 89.  
 272. Id. § 2(9).  
 
 273. Unfair Trade Practices, Fair Trade Commission Notification No. 15 (June 18, 1982) (Japan), 
available at http://www.jftc.go.jp/e-page/acts/gd.htm. 
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  interference with the internal operation of a competing 
company.274 
Against any one of these acts, the Fair Trade Commission will issue a 
cease and desist order. No penal sanction is provided, however, for unfair 
trade practices. Regarding its civil procedure, a party that suffers or is 
threatened to suffer damages from an unfair trade practice can require an 
injunction,275 in addition to compensation for any damage. 
Regulation of concentration consists of the regulation of mergers, 
inclusive of acquisition of stocks or businesses, and that of “general 
concentration.”276 The latter is related to the holding of shares and has no 
relevance to intellectual property.277  
Section 21 of the Antimonopoly Act provides an exemption for the 
exercise of IPRs.278 It reads: 
The provisions of this Act shall not apply to such acts recognizable as 
the exercise of rights under the Copyright Act, the Patent Act, the 
Utility Model Act, the Design Act or the Trademark Act. 
This provision, which seems to exempt all anticompetitive acts as long as 
they relate to IPRs, has come to be considered inconsistent with the aim of 
the Act itself, since many anticompetitive actions often are supported by the 
existence of intellectual property. Therefore, commentators have attempted 
to limit the exemption in various ways. One approach, which was adopted by 
the Fair Trade Commission in 1999, is to distinguish actions that deviate 
from the IPR system’s aim to provide appropriate incentives to innovation 
from the “acts recognizable as the exercise of [IP] rights.”279 According to 
this view, such actions, even though they may take the form of the exercise 
of IPRs, are regarded as the abuse of them and should not escape regulation 
by the Antimonopoly Act. 
 274. Id.  
 275. See Antimonopoly Act § 24. 
 276. Id. §§ 9-18.  
 277. The regulation of “general concentration” includes a prohibition of holding companies that 
may cause excessive concentration of economic power, id. § 9, restrictions on the total amount of 
stockholding by huge, non-financial companies, id. § 9-2, as well as a prohibition against financial 
institutions holding more than 5% of the shares of any company, id. § 11. 
 278. Prior to 2000, this provision was found in Section 23. 
 279. See infra text accompanying notes 389-91. 
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The differences between the various approaches proposed by 
commentators are of a theoretical nature. In other words, commentators do 
not differ much in their analyses of conceivable anticompetitive actions. 
A. History of the Guidelines on Enforcement of IPRs 
In 1968, Japan’s Fair Trade Commission (JFTC) published its first 
guidelines on the IPR-competition law interface. These guidelines, called the 
“Antimonopoly Act Guidelines for International Licensing Agreements,” 
aimed to regulate “unfair” provisions in license agreements.280 In most 
license agreements before 1968, the licensor was an American or European 
company and the licensee was a Japanese counterpart. As a result, the 
guidelines worked to protect Japanese business, which was still in its infancy. 
In 1989, the JFTC published entirely new guidelines entitled the 
“Guidelines for the Regulation of Unfair Trade Practices with Respect to 
Patent and Know-how Licensing Agreements.”281 These guidelines reflected 
Japan’s technological development during the 1970s and 1980s, and posed a 
more balanced standard. However, the guidelines were confined to an 
analysis of unfair trade practices. Furthermore, under the influence of 
European regulation of technology transfer, the guidelines evaluated every 
conceivable provision of license agreements as “white,” “gray,” or “black.” 
The most recent guidelines, published in 1998,282 further improved on the 
1989 guidelines. Specifically, the 1998 guidelines do not limit their scope of 
analysis to unfair trade practices. In addition, they provide for private 
monopolization283 and unreasonable restraints of trade.284 Furthermore, they 
now appear to adopt the rule of reason approach completely. Instead of 
categorizing contractual provisions into “black,” “gray,” and “white,” 
provisions violate the Antimonopoly Act if “the obligation may have an 
adverse effect on competition in a market.”285 
The scope of the guidelines is still limited in that, at least on their face, 
they only discuss license agreements for patent and know-how. Considering 
 280. Kokusaiteki Gijutsu Dônyû Keiyaku ni kansuru Nintei Kijun [Antimonopoly Act Guidelines 
for International Licensing Agreements] (May 24, 1968), reprinted in YOSHIKAZU KAWAI, 
KOKUSAITEKI KEIYAKU TO DOKUSENKINSHIHO [INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS AND THE 
ANTIMONOPOLY ACT] 254 (1978). 
 281. Japan Fair Trade Comm’n, Guidelines for the Regulation of Unfair Trade Practices with 
Respect to Patent and Know-How Licensing Agreements (Feb. 15, 1989). 
 282. GPLAs, supra note 4.  
 283. See id. pt. 3.3. 
 284. See id. pt. 3.2. 
 285. Id. pt. 4.3(2)a(a).  
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the importance of copyright, especially in relation to computer software, the 
JTFC reportedly is preparing guidelines on copyright enforcement as well.286 
V. COMPARISON OF THE IPR/COMPETITION LAW GUIDELINES 
A. The Canadian Intellectual Property Enforcement Guidelines 
1. Preparation of the Guidelines 
The Canadian Competition Bureau issued its first draft of the IPEGs in 
June 1999. After a further round of cross-country consultations it issued a 
second draft in April 2000. Finally, in September 2000, the Competition 
Bureau released the final version.287  
Three Competition Bureau staff members had made the case some nine 
years earlier that Canada should follow “the example of the U.S., EC and 
Japan by developing its own set of IPR licensing guidelines.”288 In 
developing the IPEGs, the Bureau was influenced significantly by the 1995 
U.S. Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property and by 
the experience of other jurisdictions, including the European Union. As a 
result, the approach taken in the IPEGs is “based on the premise that the 
Competition Act generally applies to conduct involving IP as it applies to 
conduct involving other forms of property.”289 
Prior to creating the IPEGs, the Competition Bureau prepared other 
guidelines, including the Price Discrimination Guidelines290 and the 
MEGs.291 Guidelines may not have a binding effect, but they do provide 
significant practical assistance to firms and their lawyers in determining the 
accepted limits of regulatory discretion. They lend transparency and 
accountability to regulatory activities and provide guidance on how that 
discretion will be applied to specific cases involving the handling of IPRs in 
commercial transactions. Guidelines are even more important where, as in 
the Canadian example, the great majority of cases are dealt with at the 
Bureau level and not before the courts. Also, given the transborder traffic in 
IPRs, it was incumbent on the Bureau to join their foreign regulatory 
 286. NIHON KEIZAI SHINBUN, Apr. 8, 2001. 
 287. IPEGs, supra note 3. 
 288. R. Anderson et al., The Competition Policy Treatment of Intellectual Property Rights in 
Canada: Retrospect and Prospect, in CANADIAN COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY AT THE 
CENTENARY, supra note 236, at 532. 
 289. IPEGs, supra note 3, pt. 1 (emphasis added). 
 290. Canada Competition Bureau, Price Discrimination Enforcement Guidelines (1992), available 
at http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/SSG/ct01140e.html.  
 291. See MEGs, supra note 261. 
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counterparts in issuing guidelines. In this context, the IPEGs embraced the 
principle, common to the other jurisdictions, that “[t]he role of competition 
law . . . is to maintain competitive markets that promote innovation 
competition and the diffusion of technological advances, while at the same 
time guarding against attempts to exercise market power above and beyond 
statutory IP rights.”292 
The four characteristics of the Bureau’s approach to application of the Act 
to intellectual property are: 
1) The circumstances in which the Bureau may apply the Act to 
conduct involving IP or IP rights fall into two broad categories: those 
involving something more than the mere exercise of the IP right, and 
those involving the mere exercise of the IP right and nothing else. The 
Bureau will use the general provisions of the Act to address the former 
circumstances and Section 32 (Special Remedies) to address the latter 
cases; 
2) In either case, the Bureau does not presume that the conduct is 
anticompetitive, violates the general provisions of the Competition 
Act, or should be remedied under Section 32; 
3) The analytical framework that the Bureau uses to determine the 
presence of anticompetitive effects stemming from the exercise of 
rights to other forms of property is sufficiently flexible to apply to 
conduct involving IP, even though IP has important characteristics that 
distinguish it from other forms of property; [and] 
4) When conduct involving an IP right warrants a special remedy 
under Section 32, the Bureau will act only in the very rare 
circumstances described in the Guidelines and when the relevant IP 
statute cannot remedy the conduct.293 
Intellectual property rights, for purposes of the IPEGs, include those 
rights granted under the Copyright Act,294 the Patent Act,295 the Trademark 
Act,296 the Industrial Design Act,297 the Integrated Circuits Topography 
 292. A. Neil Campbell, The Application of Competition Laws to Intellectual Property in Canada 5 
(June 1, 2001) (paper presented to the International Antitrust Conference in Vancouver), available at 
http://www.mcbinch.com/Inprint/Files/print-321.pdf, citing IPEGs, supra note 3, pts. 3.3-3.4. 
 293. IPEGs, supra note 3, pt. 1 (emphasis added). 
 294. Copyright Act, R.S.C., ch. C-42 (1985) (Can.). 
 295. Patent Act, R.S.C., ch. P-4 (2001) (Can.). 
 296. Trademark Act, R.S.C., ch. T-13 (1985) (Can.). 
 297. Industrial Design Act, R.S.C., ch. I-9 (1985) (Can.). 
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Act,298 and the Plant Breeders’ Rights Act.299 Finally, the term “IP rights,” as 
covered by the Guidelines, also includes “the protection afforded IP under 
common law and the Quebec Civil Code, including that given to trade secrets 
and unregistered trademarks.”300 
As the first part of this Article argues, the character and extent of IPRs 
vary significantly between copyrights, patents, and trademarks, not to 
mention common law trade secrets and other specialized IPRs. Thus, the 
definition and protection of trade secrets rests upon non-statutory law. 
Copyrights, on the other hand, have a very long statutory monopoly period. 
In the case of patents, compulsory licensing remedies are available in certain 
situations under the Patent Act. In other words, it is difficult to have a 
common analytical framework that is based on the “property is property” 
rationale if one takes into account the variations in property rights that are so 
prevalent with IPRs.  
The IPEGs do not fully comprehend the implications of such variations in 
their analytical framework. The organization and development of the IP-
technology economy have devilish implications for a host of analytical issues 
including market definitions, anticompetitive effects, efficiencies, and ease of 
entry factors. 
2. The “Mere Exercise” of an IP Right 
The IPEGs define the “mere exercise” of an IP right “as the exercise of 
the owner’s right to unilaterally exclude others from using the IP.”301 Refusal 
to license cases are an example. The IP owner’s use or non-use of the IP is, 
for enforcement purposes, the mere exercise of an IP right. However, the Act 
will be applied when 
IP rights form the basis of arrangements between independent entities, 
whether in the form of a transfer, licensing arrangement or agreement 
to use or enforce IP rights, and when the alleged competitive harm 
stems from such an arrangement and not just from the mere exercise 
of the IP right and nothing else.”302 
In these cases, the presence of IP “should not be a mitigating factor” 
where the joint conduct of two or more firms lessens or prevents 
 298. Integrated Circuit Topography Act, S.C., ch. 37 (1993) (Can.). 
 299. Plant Breeders’ Rights Act, S.C., ch. 20 (1990) (Can.).  
 300. IPEGs, supra note 3, pt. 1.  
 301. Id. pt. 4.2.1.  
 302. Id. (emphasis added). 
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competition.303 Proscribed anticompetitive conduct includes “conspiracy, bid 
rigging, joint abuse of market dominance, market allocation agreements and 
[anticompetitive] mergers restrict[ing] competition among firms actually or 
potentially producing substitute products or services.”304 
Refusal to deal cases will attract the Bureau’s interest if the “refusal to 
license or to grant others access to a firm’s IP rights turns out to have 
included conduct which goes beyond such a refusal.”305 An example is where 
a firm systematically acquires “a controlling collection of IP rights and then 
refuses to license the rights to others, thereby substantially lessening or 
preventing competition in markets associated with the IP rights.”306  
Two other refusal to license situations may attract the enforcement 
interest of the Bureau. The first occurs “when a licensor ties a non-
proprietary product to a product covered by its IP right.”307 The second 
possibility arises “when a firm effectively extends its market power beyond 
the term of its patent through an exclusive contract.”308 As the Bureau sees it, 
“if the conduct leads to the creation, enhancement or maintenance of market 
power so as to substantially lessen or prevent competition,” the licensing 
conduct may be investigated.309 
Section 79 of the Competition Act is the abuse of dominance provision. It 
states that the “mere exercise” of an IPR cannot be considered 
anticompetitive.310 In removing the “mere exercise” cases from the 
proscribed competitive injury provisions, the Act tells the IPR holder that its 
conduct will be examined only when the competitive harm stems from 
something more than the refusal itself. A practical problem, however, is that 
“it may well be difficult to distinguish whether competitive harm arises 
exclusively from the refusal or from some other practice.”311 
 303. Id. 
 304. Id. 
 305. Id. 
 306. Id.  
 307. Id.  
 308. Id.  
 309. Id.  
 310. Competition Act, R.S.C., ch. C-34, § 79 (1985) (Can.). 
 311. Chantale LaCasse & Brian Rivard, The Intellectual Property Enforcement Guidelines and the 
Treatment of Innovation: Assessment and Comparison with the U.S. Approach, 20 CAN. COMPETITION 
RECORD 90, 102 (2001). The authors cite the “disappearing” IPEGs hypothetical case example (from a 
previous draft of the IPEGs) that “purported to illustrate the distinction between ‘mere exercise’ and 
‘further investigation’ cases” in which “a firm initially licenses technical specifications to encourage 
software producers to develop products for its hardware. Although the firm had promised to continue 
licensing its technical specifications, it decides at a certain point to renege on its promise. The previous 
draft argued that the competitive harm in this example stemmed from the breach of the firm’s promise 
rather than the refusal per se. Interestingly, this example was dropped from the final version of the 
IPEGs. No explanation for its removal was given, therefore it is unclear whether the Bureau would 
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3. The Section 32 Possibilities 
In removing the “mere exercise” of IPRs from the ambit of the 
Competition Act, it is evident that “[t]he main enforcement principle of the 
IPEGs . . . again reflects a view that the intellectual property laws are the 
main instruments to promote innovation. Antitrust enforcement should not 
weaken basic property rights because doing so would damage the incentives 
that intellectual property laws create for innovation and creative 
endeavours.”312 
Section 32, as we saw earlier,313 provides for “special remedies.”314 The 
provision deals specifically with anticompetitive conduct involving IPRs. 
Conduct must be shown to lead to an undue restraint of trade or lessened 
competition. The remedies available include modifying the rights held by the 
IP owner, revoking those rights, and compulsory licensing. There is no 
counterpart to Section 32 in U.S. law. The IPEGs Section 32 hypothetical 
example involves only the case of a refusal to license,315 suggesting, if 
nothing else, that this conduct would come under Section 32 attack. 
Under its two-step enforcement procedure, the Bureau, in the first 
instance, will look for evidence that “the refusal is a significant factor in 
restricting competition by firms that could add new value to the economy.”316 
The second enforcement step “requires the Bureau to conduct an explicit 
examination of the incentives to innovate once the remedy is in place.”317 
Evaluating innovation incentives in a given market is a daunting task, made 
more difficult by the fact that Section 32 analysis requires an assessment of 
whether a special remedy would “adversely alter the incentives to invest in 
research and development in the economy.”318 The Bureau considers this step 
consider reviewing such conduct under the general provisions.” Id. 
 312. Id. at 103. 
 313. See supra text accompanying notes 198-205. 
 314. Competition Act, R.S.C., ch. C-34, § 32 (1985) (Can.). 
 315. See infra text p. 157, Case No. 10. 
 316. LaCasse & Rivard, supra note 311, at 103. This could happen, for example, if the would-be 
competitor firms entered the market by introducing differentiated or improved versions of the 
intellectual property, or if the intellectual property becomes an essential component in the production 
of a downstream product. The essential component situation is similar to the type of case the U.S.’s 
“essential facilities” doctrine is meant to address. 
 317. Id. at 103. 
 318. Competition Act § 32 (emphasis added).  
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satisfied “if the refusal to license the IP is stifling further innovation.”319 This 
rationale has not been accepted favorably.320 
4. Relevant Markets 
The IPEGs state that “[r]elevant markets provide a practical tool for 
assessing market power.”321 Where the transaction or conduct under scrutiny 
involves the exercise of IPRs, defining the relevant market still involves 
determination of the availability of sufficiently close substitutes in the same 
market. Thus, the relevant market is defined on the basis of one of the 
following determinations: “the intangible knowledge or know-how that 
constitutes the IP, processes that are based on the IP rights, or the final or 
intermediate goods resulting from, or incorporating, the IP.”322 
Where a case involves IP licensing, the Bureau advises that it “generally 
treats the license as the terms of trade under which the licensee is entitled to 
use the IP.”323 More particularly, the Bureau will look very closely at “what 
the legal rights granted to the licensee actually protect.”324 In other words, the 
Bureau does not define a relevant market around a license. Nor are markets 
defined on the basis of research and development activity or the U.S. concept 
of innovative markets. Instead, 
[t]he Bureau usually concentrates on price or output effects. Conduct 
that directly reduces the innovation effort of the firms under scrutiny 
or restricts or prevents the innovation efforts of others may be 
anticompetitive. The appropriate relevant market definition or 
definitions will depend specifically on the knowledge or know-how, 
process, or final or any intermediate good toward which the 
innovation effort is directed.325 
This approach is unclear. How will market definition actually work in 
intellectual property situations? For example, how would a “know-how” 
market actually be defined when using the hypothetical monopolist 
 319. IPEGs, supra note 3, § 4.2.2. 
 320. LaCasse & Rivard, supra note 311 at 104: “[I]t is hard to see how from the fact that a 
conduct harms innovation at a point in time in a given market, it must readily follow that intervention 
will not harm the incentives to innovate of other firms, in other markets in the economy, at any other 
point in the future. This easier test does not logically seem to be sufficient to establish that the second 
step of the analysis under Section 32 is satisfied.” 
 321. IPEGs, supra note 3, § 5.1.  
 322. Id.  
 323. Id.  
 324. Id.  
 325. Id.  
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methodology? This methodology is difficult to operationalize at the best of 
times and does not seem well suited for analyzing intangible IPRs. 
What analytical techniques will the Bureau apply in retrospective 
situations where there is a concern that market power was already exercised? 
Will markets really not be defined around licenses (which appears to have 
been the approach taken in Warner)? And, finally, how will the Bureau focus 
alternatively on know-how, on processes, and on goods resulting from the 
IPR?326 
5. Market Power and Concentration 
After identifying the relevant market, the next question is whether a 
transaction or conduct involving IP has resulted in an increase in market 
power that calls for further inquiry by the Bureau.327 Consideration depends 
on a number of factors with weight and relevance that likely will vary in each 
case. Such factors include “the level of concentration, the entry conditions, 
the rate of technological change, the ability of firms to ‘leap-frog over’ 
seemingly entrenched positions, and the horizontal effects, if any, on the 
market.”328 
Obviously, any increased market power in the relevant market must be 
assessed against market concentration, if only to become more informed 
about the competitiveness of the relevant market. Thus, for example, “the 
more firms there are in the relevant market, the less likely it is that any one 
firm acting unilaterally, or . . . cooperatively [with others], could enhance or 
maintain market power through the transaction or conduct [under 
review].”329 On the other hand, the presence of a high degree of market 
concentration is not sufficient in itself to justify the determination that the 
same “transaction or conduct will create, enhance, or maintain market 
power.”330 
Market concentration typically is measured by calculating the market 
shares of the firms identified as actual participants in the relevant market.331 
These include 
firms identified as offering products that are demand substitutes as 
well as those that represent potential supply substitutes (i.e., firms that 
 326. Campbell, supra note 292, at 253. 
 327. IPEGs, supra note 3, § 5.2.  
 328. Id. § 5.2.1. 
 329. Id.  
 330. Id.  
 331. Id.  
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are likely to respond to a price increase in the relevant market within 
one year with minimal investment).332 
In general, market shares under 35% held by one firm or a group of firms 
acting together are not likely to attract the Bureau’s attention.333 A higher 
market share may attract the Bureau’s interest, but only if other 
anticompetitive considerations are also in play. When all is said and done, the 
assessment of market power and concentration poses significant 
measurement challenges for any enforcement authority. As the Bureau puts 
it, “the Bureau’s assessment of market power is likely to focus on qualitative 
factors, such as conditions of entry into the relevant market, whether IP 
development is resulting in a rapid pace of technological change, the views 
of buyers and market participants, and industry and technology experts.”334 
6. Markets and Ease of Entry 
Conditions of entry are “often more important than market concentration” 
in assessing effects in markets involving IP.335 The reason is the volatility 
and pace of technological change in product or service markets where IPRs 
are an important part of entrepreneurial assets. In these circumstances, using 
IPRs, firms are able “to innovate around” or “leap-frog over” apparently 
entrenched market leaders.336 Hence, the ease with which firms can enter the 
relevant market is an important determination in assessing the capacity of IP-
related transactions or conduct to maintain or enhance market power. 
Similarly, the Bureau will investigate the extent to which the transaction or 
conduct itself erects barriers to entry or induces competitors to exit the 
market. Entry into the pharmaceuticals market, for example, may be difficult 
because of the sunk costs associated with developing patentable 
medicines.337 
7. Horizontal Anticompetitive Effects 
The Bureau will focus on whether conduct that involves an IPR right, 
“whether it is a merger transaction, licensing arrangement or other form of 
contractual arrangement,” will result in “horizontal anticompetitive effects 
 332. Id.  
 333. Id.  
 334. Id. 
 335. Id. § 5.2.2.  
 336. Id.  
 337. See id. 
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for firms producing substitutes or firms potentially producing substitutes.”338 
The effects are manifested in the exercise of market power in areas such as 
pricing and outputs. Consider one example cited by the Bureau involving IP 
licensing arrangements where one firm sold the right to use its IP to another 
firm.339 This appears to be a vertical arrangement. However, it still can have 
significant horizontal effects, particularly if the licensor and licensee would 
have been competitors in the absence of the licensing arrangement. Similarly, 
an IP-related transaction or conduct may reduce innovative activity with 
anticompetitive results “if it prevents future competition in a prospective 
product or process market.”340 
8. Efficiency Considerations 
Under Section 96, where the Bureau concludes that a merger is likely to 
substantially lessen or prevent competition in a relevant market, it then will 
consider whether the merger generates efficiencies that offset the 
anticompetitive effects.341 The assessment criteria are described more fully in 
the Bureau’s MEGs.342 
The availability of the Section 96 merger efficiency gains defense 
distinguishes Canadian merger law from its U.S. counterpart. The burden is 
on the party invoking the efficiency defense to establish that any alleged 
efficiency gains would not likely be realized in the absence of the merger, or 
“put another way, that such efficiency gains would not likely be realized if 
the Competition Commissioner obtains an order preventing the merger from 
occurring.”343 Before the Hillsdown decision of the Competition Tribunal,344 
the Bureau believed that “the only loss against which efficiency gains should 
be compared is ‘deadweight loss,’” defined as “the negative allocation effect 
on the sum of producer and consumer surplus within Canada.”345 In everyday 
language, “deadweight loss” is “the total amount of wealth lost by society as 
a whole as a result of the merger.”346 Hillsdown recognized a wider definition 
of the relevant loss against which efficiency gains should be measured.  
The result, if the Bureau adopts it in future cases, will diminish the force 
 338. Id. § 5.2.3.  
 339. See id. § 7, ex. 4.  
 340. Id. § 5.3 (emphasis added). 
 341. Id. § 5.4.  
 342. Id.; see also MEGs, supra note 261. 
 343. FLAVELL & KENT, supra note 176, at 108. 
 344. Director of Investigation and Research v. Hillsdown Holdings (Canada) Ltd., [1992] 41 
C.P.R. (3d) 289. 
 345. FLAVELL & KENT, supra note 176, at 109. 
 346. Id. 
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of the efficiency defense. It is interesting to note that the IPEGs do not 
provide a hypothetical example of the Bureau’s treatment of efficiency 
considerations, even though the discussion of efficiencies is longer than the 
IPEGs’ treatment of anticompetitive effects. 
Efficiency rationales and business justifications also are relevant to the 
Bureau’s determination of whether conduct is anticompetitive in Section 79 
abuse of dominant position cases, and in Section 77 exclusive dealing, tied 
selling, and market restriction cases.347 The consideration of pro-competitive 
effects in these cases is more noteworthy given that these practices do not 
contain formal efficiency defenses. 
B. Application of the Guidelines to Hypothetical Cases 
In this part of the Article, we reproduce the essence of the ten 
Hypothetical Examples in Part 7 of the Canadian IPEGs. The hypothetical 
cases were developed by the Bureau to illustrate the Bureau’s enforcement 
approach. Apparently, none of the cases has been replicated in an actual 
proceeding brought by the Bureau against a Canadian IPR holder.  
It is fruitful to review the hypothetical cases to predict how Canadian 
competition authorities will approach similar situations under the IPEGs. Our 
assessment illustrates the similarities and differences of approach and 
coverage taken by the Japanese and Canadian competition regimes against 
the creation, maintenance, and enhancement of IPRs. 
1. Case 1–Alleged Infringement of an IP Right348 
a. Facts 
TAX, a software company, produces and distributes household tax 
planning programs. It is the leading producer of tax management software. 
Its programs are sophisticated and complex. Registered customers may 
purchase software upgrades for low prices. Each copy of each distributed 
program carries a serial number. The serial numbers do not prevent 
duplication, but they indicated that if the number has been used more than 
once then its software has been reproduced illegally.  
Two years ago, a key member of TAX’s software engineering team left 
the company to start her own software business, UPSTART. Recently, 
UPSTART started marketing its own tax management program, to be used in 
 347. See IPEGs, supra note 3, § 7.  
 348. Id. § 7, ex. 1.  
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conjunction with TAX’s product. UPSTART’s program operates as a 
graphical user interface, and minor tax code changes can be incorporated into 
it as well. TAX is selling fewer upgrades because UPSTART’s product is 
sold for a much lower price. TAX alleges that UPSTART must have 
infringed on TAX’s copyright because UPSTART’s programs could not 
have been created without copying TAX’s source code. TAX formally 
complains to the Bureau. 
b. Issue 
Is this a competition case for the Bureau? 
c. The Bureau’s Proposed Enforcement Approach 
No. The real issue is one of alleged copyright infringement. Any remedy 
should be sought under the Copyright Act. 
2. Case 2–Price Fixing349 
a. Facts 
Three firms offer competing cosmetic surgical procedures to treat a 
particular condition. Each firm owns its own patented technique. Their 
results are remarkably similar, in terms of cost and patient success rates. The 
only existing alternative to the three procedures is an expensive medication, 
which has undesirable side effects in some patients.  
The three firms agree on a minimum price per procedure and a minimum 
fee to license each procedure to third parties. Before this agreement, the 
procedures cost approximately $5,000 each. After the agreement, they cost 
about $8,000 each. 
b. Issue 
Is this a Section 45 conspiracy case? 
c. The Bureau’s Proposed Enforcement Approach  
Yes. The Bureau likely would refer the matter to the Attorney General for 
a Section 45 prosecution. 
 349. Id. § 7, ex. 2.  
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d. Rationale 
Analysis of the relevant market and direct evidence of market power 
exploitation indicate that we are dealing with the same relevant market and 
the parties’ collective market power. Thus, the Bureau will look for evidence 
that the parties knew or should have known the agreement would “unduly 
lessen competition.” Together, the parties appear to account for 100% of the 
relevant market. Their separate patents together provide effective entry 
barriers to present or potential competitors. 
3. Case 3–Exclusive Licensing—Enhancing Competition350 
a. Facts 
SHIFT has developed a new gear system for mountain bikes. Two other 
companies manufacture competing gear systems. All three firms manufacture 
other kinds of gear systems as well, and each has an active research and 
development program to improve gear system technology.  
SHIFT does not make entire mountain bikes. Instead, it licenses its 
patented gear system technology to bike manufacturers. ADVENTURE, the 
largest mountain bike maker, supplies 30% of the mountain bike market. 
Two other manufacturers together account for 50% of sales. Six smaller 
firms account for the rest. ADVENTURE only manufactures bikes. It does 
not own or have the ability to develop gear system technology. The demand 
for the adventure mountain bikes equipped with SHIFT’s new gear 
technology is uncertain. There will be, as a result, significant promotional 
expenses to position the new bikes in the market. SHIFT has refused to 
license its new technology to the other mountain bike manufacturers. 
However, given the active research and development in the industry, 
alternative gear system technologies are likely to come on stream in the 
future. 
b. Issue 
Does SHIFT’s exclusive licensing to ADVENTURE amount to an abuse 
of a dominant position under Section 79? 
 350. Id. § 7, ex. 3.1.  
 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol1/iss1/15
p323 Neilson book pages.doc  10/15/02  11:51 AM 
 
 
 
 
 
2002] INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND COMPETITION LAW 383 
 
 
 
 
 
c. The Bureau’s Proposed Enforcement Approach 
On the facts, the exclusive licensing arrangement does not raise 
competition concerns for the Bureau. 
d. Rationale 
(1) SHIFT and ADVENTURE are supplier and customer, respectively; 
they are neither actual nor potential competitors. 
(2) As non-competitors, the exclusive license likely would not lessen 
competition between them. 
(3) However, it is necessary to examine the markets for gear systems and 
mountain bikes to determine whether the exclusive license has or is likely to 
lessen or prevent competition in either or both of these markets. 
(4) It is true that the markets for gear systems and mountain bikes are 
concentrated. However, SHIFT’s two competitor firms still may sell to 
ADVENTURE, and other gear systems are still available in the market. 
(5) ADVENTURE’s heavy promotional expenses suggest that the 
exclusive license may have been granted partly in consideration for 
ADVENTURE’s agreement to incur these expenses in the development and 
promotion of bikes that use SHIFT’s technology. 
(6) The exclusive license in no way limits the ability of other mountain 
bike makers to access or use competing technologies. 
4. Case 4–Exclusive Licensing—Foreclosure by Purchaser351 
a. Facts 
Building on the facts in Case 3, assume that ADVENTURE now has 70% 
of the mountain bike sales market. With this share of the market, it is able to 
independently negotiate long term exclusive licensing and supply 
arrangements with the three competing suppliers of mountain bike gear 
systems. Several competing manufacturers, unable to obtain suitable gear 
system technology, go out of business. The price of ADVENTURE’s 
mountain bikes rises by 25%. Alternative gear system technologies are being 
developed, but nothing is likely to enter the market for at least thirty-six 
months. 
 351. Id. § 7, ex. 3.2.  
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b. Issue 
Is this an abuse of dominant position case? 
c. The Bureau’s Proposed Enforcement Approach 
Yes. In this case, the Bureau likely would seek to have the exclusive 
licenses voluntarily terminated. Failing that, the Bureau likely would apply to 
the Competition Tribunal, seeking to terminate licenses. 
d. Rationale 
(1) The relevant product market is mountain bikes. ADVENTURE is the 
dominant supplier in that market. The apparent lack of good substitutes, 
ADVENTURE’s 70% market share, and its ability to impose a 25% price 
hike provide evidence of substantial control. 
(2) Some exclusive licensing arrangements may enhance competition, but 
the use of such an arrangement to control the supply of an essential product 
part may be anticompetitive. Here, for example, the execution of a long-term 
exclusive license with each supplier prevents competitors from obtaining the 
necessary gear systems. 
(3) There is no compelling evidence of efficiency benefits or business 
justifications. 
5. Case 5–Exclusive Licensing—Foreclosure by Suppliers352 
a. Facts 
In this case, another variation on Case 3, the gear system suppliers, 
concerned about ADVENTURE’s growing purchasing power, agree to 
subdivide the market for mountain bike systems among themselves. To 
monitor compliance, the firms agree to enter into exclusive license 
agreements, at premium prices, with ADVENTURE. The result of this 
arrangement is the same as that described in Case 4. 
b. Issue 
Does this case raise questions under the conspiracy provisions of Section 
45 and/or the joint abuse-of-dominance provision of Section 79? 
 352. Id. § 7, ex. 3.3.  
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c. The Bureau’s Proposed Enforcement Approach 
This case likely would be referred to the Attorney General for a Section 
45 prosecution. Alternatively, the Bureau may seek to terminate the market 
allocation agreement and the exclusive licenses under the Section 79 abuse-
of-dominance provision. 
d. Rationale 
(1) If the agreement was a blatant market allocation scheme implemented 
in a covert manner, the Bureau likely will proceed under Section 45. 
(2) On the other hand, a specialization arrangement, under which each 
supplier publicly agrees to focus on a particular gear system technology that 
the parties disclosed to and discussed with ADVENTURE, likely would be 
investigated as a Section 79 joint abuse-of-dominance case. 
(3) The gear systems comprise the relevant market. Given the apparent 
lack of good substitutes, the suppliers’ and ADVENTURE’s shares of high 
sales, and their ability to impose price increases, it appears that the gear 
system suppliers have market power or substantially control the gear system 
business. 
6. Case 6–Exclusive Contracts353 
a. Facts 
Thanks to its international patents, SPICE is the sole supplier of Megasalt, 
a unique salt substitute created for certain prepared foods and available in 
most countries. SPICE’s Canadian patent recently expired, but it still has 
valid patent protection in most of the rest of the world. Just before its 
Canadian patent expired, SPICE signed five-year exclusive supply contracts 
with the two biggest Canadian buyers who use Megasalt in specially 
prepared foods for hospitals and other health care institutions. The exclusive 
supply contracts prevent the two buyers from combining Megasalt with any 
other salt substitute on the same product line. These are SPICE’s only long-
term exclusive supply contracts anywhere. 
NUsalt just developed a potential substitute for Megasalt. NUsalt 
complains to the Bureau that SPICE’s exclusive supply contracts make it 
unprofitable for NUsalt to enter the Canadian market. 
 353. Id. § 7, ex. 4.  
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b. Issue 
Is this a case for Bureau investigation under Section 77 (exclusive 
dealing) and/or Section 79 (abuse-of-dominant position)? 
c. The Bureau’s Proposed Enforcement Approach 
If SPICE has no compelling efficiency rationale or business justification 
for the exclusivity provisions, the Bureau likely would seek to have SPICE’s 
exclusive licenses voluntarily terminated. If this did not work, the Bureau 
would apply to the Competition Tribunal, seeking to terminate the licenses. 
d. Rationale 
(1) Salt substitutes constitute the relevant market and SPICE substantially 
controls that market. 
(2) The exclusive supply contracts constitute exclusive dealing. The 
formation of these contracts constitutes an anticompetitive act if the contracts 
were intended to remove demand from potential entrants like NUsalt, such 
that the remaining demand “would provide an insufficient volume of sales to 
cover the cost of entry and future operating costs in Canada.”354  
(3) If the exclusive supply contracts are determined to be the principal 
barrier to new entry by close substitutes for Megasalt, then a finding that 
SPICE’s actions could substantially lessen competition is likely. 
(4) The possibility of an efficiency defense is possible but unlikely. 
SPICE might argue that it signed exclusive contracts in order to ensure that it 
would have sufficient sales to justify investing in enough productive capacity 
to realize economies of scale. In addition, the restriction preventing buyers 
from combining Megasalt with other salt substitutes may have a safety or 
quality rationale. If such justification were strong enough, the Bureau could 
set aside its challenge under Sections 77 or 79. 
7. Case 7–Output Royalties355 
a. Facts 
MEMEX holds a design patent (due to expire within the year) on a 
memory component it manufactures for use in personal home computers 
 354. Id. 
 355. Id. § 7, ex. 5.  
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(PCs). MEMEX sells its memory components and licenses the use of its 
technology to PC makers who pay MEMEX every time its component is 
installed in a PC. MEMEX recently introduced a new license agreement 
under which MEMEX grants non-exclusive licenses for the use of its 
technology and memory components to all PC makers for a royalty on every 
PC shipped, regardless of whether the PC includes a MEMEX memory 
component, plus a further fee for every MEMEX memory component the PC 
maker installs. Why two fees? Because, according to MEMEX, PC makers 
previously did not use enough MEMEX memory components, detracting 
from PC performance. MEMEX claims the new license makes it cheaper for 
PC makers to install a more appropriate quantity of memory in their PCs—so 
MEMEX offsets its loss in revenue by charging a royalty on every PC sold. 
b. Issue 
Are MEMEX’s output royalties reviewable under Section 79 as an abuse 
of a dominant position? 
c. The Bureau’s Proposed Enforcement Approach 
In the absence of offsetting efficiency benefits or business justifications, 
the Bureau likely would seek to have the new license voluntarily terminated. 
If that did not work, it would apply to the Competition Tribunal, seeking to 
terminate the practice. Much depends on the definition of “relevant market.” 
d. Rationale 
(1) If the Bureau concludes that non-MEMEX memory components are 
good substitutes for MEMEX components and that there are few barriers to 
entry, then the investigation may be dropped. However, if non-MEMEX 
components are not considered good substitutes, then MEMEX technology 
will define the relevant market and MEMEX substantially controls that 
market. 
(2) The new licensing contracts may not expressly prohibit PC makers 
from using non-MEMEX components, but they do impose a tax on the PC 
makers in such cases. The Bureau would determine whether the contracts are 
in widespread use, their duration, and their deterrence effect. 
(3) If the result of the contracts is to give MEMEX greater market power 
after its patent expired than otherwise would have been the case, then the 
Bureau will look at efficiency rationales and any other business justifications. 
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8. Case 8–A Patent Pooling Arrangement356 
a. Facts 
ABC and ZENIX each produce X-ray imaging machines to help diagnose 
cancer. Each firm has a series of patents on certain components of their 
respective machines. The machines are functionally interchangeable. The 
design of one of ZENIX’s machine components may infringe on one of 
ABC’s patents. ABC threatens to sue ZENIX for patent infringement if 
ZENIX markets its machine without first getting a license from ABC to use 
the patented component. To avoid litigation, ZENIX and ABC place their 
various patents in a patent pool which has a $500 licensing fee—to be paid to 
the pool each time an X-ray imaging machine produced by either firm is used 
in a medical diagnosis. Proceeds from the fees are to be split between the 
firms according to a predetermined formula. The amount of the fee means 
that neither firm is likely to charge medical practitioners less than $500 per 
procedure. 
b. Issue 
Does the patent pooling arrangement contravene the conspiracy 
provisions of Section 45? 
c. The Bureau’s Proposed Enforcement Approach 
It is possible that the Bureau will challenge the patent pooling 
arrangement under Section 45 as an agreement to prevent price competition 
between ZENIX and ABC. 
d. Rationale 
(1) The terms of the patent pooling arrangement must be studied 
carefully. Some are pro-competitive because they clear blocking patents, 
avoid expensive litigation, reduce transaction costs, or integrate 
complementary technologies. If ZENIX is blocked from using its technology 
because it infringes on ABC’s patent, and if ZENIX cannot “invent around” 
the blocking patent, then “these firms cannot be considered to be horizontal 
competitors.”357  
 356. Id. § 7, ex. 6.  
 357. Id. 
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(2) Here, the blocking is one-way. ABC is free to use its machine with or 
without reaching an agreement with ZENIX. In other words, the patent 
pooling arrangement is not necessary for the new X-ray imaging machine to 
enter the marketplace. 
(3) The Bureau would be more impressed if ABC simply licensed the use 
of its infringed patent to ZENIX. It would be good for ZENIX and profitable 
for ABC, also eliminating the possibility that its patent could be found by the 
court to be invalid and therefore of zero value. On this analysis, the patent 
pool likely would be viewed as unnecessary and an anticompetitive 
commercial arrangement “which was not required in order for the new 
technology to enter the market.”358 The validity of the patent infringement 
claim would have to be assessed. If the patent claim had merit and if ZENIX 
could not easily “invent around” ABC’s patent, then the Bureau would be 
unlikely to challenge the patent pooling arrangement because it would not 
lessen competition. 
(4) If the claim is baseless or if ZENIX could easily invent around ABC’s 
patent, then the Bureau would challenge the patent pooling arrangement 
under Section 45 as an agreement to prevent price competition between 
ZENIX and ABC. 
9. Case 9— Agreement to Foreclose Complementary Products359 
a. Facts 
ROCKCO and POPCO are the two largest record labels in the U.S. Three 
other companies are also major record labels. ROCKCO and POPCO 
account for two-thirds of total sales and 70% of all major label artists. They 
form a joint venture, DISCO, to develop, produce, and market a new 
generation of digital playback devices, a technology of sound quality and 
other features far superior to other existing technologies. 
Another company, DATCO, has developed a digital sound technology 
with similar high fidelity qualities. However, DATCO’s technology is also 
portable and allows users to record. The technologies’ costs are similar, but 
the technologies themselves are incompatible—music digitally encoded in 
DISCO format must be recoded for playback on DATCO’s player. 
ROCKCO and POPCO’s joint venture agreement states that they agree 
not to release or license any other person to release their copyrighted 
recordings in a digital format other than the DISCO format. They have 
 358. Id. 
 359. Id. § 7, ex. 7.  
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declined DATCO’s request for a license to convert and release ROCKCO 
and POPCO recordings in the DATCO format. Obviously, consumers will be 
reluctant to purchase the DATCO technology if they are unable to use 
ROCKCO or POPCO music in that format. The other three record labels 
know this. They are willing to release their recordings in the DATCO format, 
but they find there is no market for them. They are forced by popular demand 
to license the DISCO technology in order to release their recordings in 
DISCO format. In effect, DATCO’s technology, which reviewers generally 
view as superior to DISCO’s technology, is being withdrawn, and DISCO is 
increasing substantially both the price of the playback equipment that it sells 
and the royalties charged to the other record companies for use of the DISCO 
technology. 
b. Issue 
How will the Bureau examine this case under the merger provision 
(Section 92) and/or the abuse-of-dominance provision (Section 79)? 
c. The Bureau’s Proposed Enforcement Approach 
The Bureau likely would seek an order from the Tribunal requiring that 
ROCKCO and POPCO divest themselves of DISCO, or that ROCKCO and 
POPCO license their works for release in alternative formats. 
d. Rationale 
(1) If the joint venture was, in substance, a merger of the musical 
recording assets of ROCKCO and POPCO, then the Bureau’s review would 
be carried out in accordance with the Merger Enforcement Guidelines. 
(2) If, on the other hand, the Bureau chose to review the joint venture 
agreement under the abuse-of-dominance provision, then we have a Section 
79 review. The choice is for the Bureau to make. 
(3) In either case, questions to be addressed include the relevant market, 
barriers to entry, evidence of market power or dominance, substantial 
prevention or lessening of competition, and the relevance of any business 
justification or efficiency defense. 
(4) Under a Section 79 review, the Bureau would have to establish that 
the joint venture had substantial market power in either the market for digital 
sound technology or digital playback equipment. It also would have to find 
that the DISCO joint venture had engaged in anticompetitive conduct that 
substantially lessens or prevents competition. Here, the anticompetitive acts 
are the acquisition and foreclosure of DISCO’s competitors’ access to the 
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music in ROCKCO and POPCO’s library. This foreclosure prevents 
alternative sound recording technologies from acquiring the critical mass of 
desirable music content required for them to achieve market viability. 
Therefore, this conduct may prevent or lessen competition and lead to the 
creation of dominance in the markets for digital sound technology and/or 
digital playback equipment sound reproduction. This reduces consumer 
choice, leads to an increase in the royalties paid by the record companies to 
use DISCO technology, and increases the price of playback devices. 
e. Comment 
Neil Campbell is critical of the IPEGs commentary accompanying Case 
9. In his view, it 
does not explain what conduct extended beyond a mere refusal to 
license IP, does not attempt to reconcile this approach with relevant 
Competition Tribunal jurisprudence, and does not discuss the IP rights 
defense which would protect the exercise of rights under the 
Copyright Act from being attacked as an abuse of dominance.360 
Far from providing appropriate guidance, Campbell sharply criticizes the 
Bureau for putting forth “an illustration that suggests little hesitation about 
re-engineering markets ex post to improve locative efficiency.”361 
10. Case 10–Bare Refusal to License IP Rights Which Protect a de 
facto Industry Standard: Section 32 Possibilities?362 
a. Facts 
ABACUS and two other firms were the first to market spreadsheet 
software for personal computers. In the first five years of its business, 
ABACUS’ market share grew to 50%. By the end of the seventh year, its 
annual market share grew to more than 75%. One of the other two original 
firms left the market. Meanwhile, after three years of programming, 
CALCULATOR introduced more innovative spreadsheet software but it ran 
into financial difficulties.  
CALCULATOR approached ABACUS to request a license to copy the 
words and layouts of its menu command hierarchy. With the license, 
 360. Campbell, supra note 292, at 7. 
 361. Id.  
 362. IPEGs, supra note 3, § 7, ex. 8.  
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CALCULATOR could relaunch its product with the ability to read 
ABACUS files and guarantee compatibility between the two products. 
ABACUS refused. ABACUS then announced that it would enforce its IP 
rights against CALCULATOR if it copied the ABACUS hierarchy. Soon 
after this announcement, several other software makers announced that they 
were discontinuing their spreadsheet development programs. 
Spreadsheets have a network effect. That is, the value of the software 
increases with the number of others who purchase compatible spreadsheets. 
The greater the size of the network, the greater the number of individuals 
with whom files can be shared, the greater the variety of complementary 
products, and the greater the number of compatible data files. 
b. Issue 
Is ABACUS’ refusal to license its IP a “mere exercise” of its IP rights? If 
so, is ABACUS subject to review under Section 32 of the Act? 
c. The Bureau’s Proposed Enforcement Approach 
The Bureau could conclude that a special remedy invoked under Section 
32 would restore incentives for other firms to engage in the research and 
development of competing compatible spreadsheet programs. The special 
remedy would allow these firms to gain access to the words and layout of 
ABACUS’ menu hierarchy. 
d. Rationale 
(1) If the relevant market is ABACUS-compatible spreadsheets, if the 
Bureau concludes that the relevant market is significantly larger than the 
subject matter of ABACUS’ IP, and if the products result directly from the 
exercise of such IPRs, then the Bureau likely would conclude that ABACUS 
is dominant in the relevant market and that the IP is an essential input for 
firms participating in the relevant market. 
(2) On this basis, ABACUS’ refusal satisfies the first step of the Bureau’s 
two-step analysis to determine whether it would seek to bring an application 
under Section 32. 
(3) In the second step, the Bureau determines whether ABACUS’ refusal 
to license its IP would adversely affect other firms’ incentives to invest in 
research and development and the economy. In this case, the facts suggest 
that it is possible that ABACUS’ ability to impose incompatibility may have 
a chilling effect on the development of more advanced spreadsheets. 
(4) In addition, ABACUS’ choice of the words and layout of its menu 
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hierarchy likely was arbitrary, involved little innovative effort, and had little 
value relative to other substitutes. In the absence of an installed base and 
switching costs, ABACUS’ terms and menu hierarchy would be no better or 
worse than CALCULATOR’s. 
(5) It is only after consumers make sunk investments, and adoption 
creates an installed base, that ABACUS’ spreadsheets become the market 
standard, and its choice of words and menu interface are required for 
compatibility with the ABACUS network. All of this creates unintended and 
unwarranted market power, a situation that can be corrected through 
enforcement action under Section 32. On this basis, the Bureau likely would 
conclude that a special remedy invoked under Section 32 would restore 
incentives for other firms to engage in research and development of 
competing compatible spreadsheet programs. 
e. Comment 
LaCasse and Rivard are less than satisfied with the Bureau’s handling of 
the ABACUS case.363 Their questions are compelling and add weight to the 
fact that Section 32’s “special remedies” have yet to be tested in a Bureau 
enforcement proceeding. In summary, they argue that the proposed 
resolution to Case 10 raises more questions than answers. For example, 
(1) Could the firms that initially entered the market have recognized the 
possibility that network effects would lead to “tipping” (i.e., to one firm 
dominating the market)? If they did, it is more than conceivable that the 
profits from being dominant in the market encouraged firms to make their 
costly initial investments. Should not the Bureau take this into consideration 
when evaluating whether the remedy is likely to chill incentives to innovate?; 
(2) The Bureau’s rationale does not articulate why the defined market 
(ABACUS-compatible spreadsheets) differs or is significantly larger than its 
IP. Is this an arbitrary or measured distinction? How do other firms interpret 
the Bureau’s finding that ABACUS’ choice of its words and layout hierarchy 
was “arbitrary”?; 
(3) “Using the seemingly arbitrary nature of firms’ choices to justify 
intervention could introduce uncertainty that would discourage future 
innovation unless the criteria used to determine when certain aspects of the 
intellectual property are arbitrary were made plain.” 364 
 363. LaCasse & Rivard, supra note 311, at 105. 
 364. Id. (emphasis added). 
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C. Some Observations on Licensing 
Eight of the ten ‘Hypothetical Examples’ posed by the Competition 
Bureau in the IPEGs involve the licensing of IPRs. 
The Competition Bureau acknowledges in the IPEGs that licensing is 
“pro-competitive . . . in the vast majority of cases . . . because it facilitates the 
broader use of a valuable IP rights by additional parties.”365 The same IPEGs 
acknowledge that licensing agreements “enhance [the IP’s] value and 
increase the incentive for its creation and use . . . [and] promote the efficient 
use of IP by facilitating the integration of IP with other components of 
production, such as manufacturing and distribution.”366 
Under the Canadian Competition Act, IP licensing agreements are subject 
to review under at least six general provisions. Except for price maintenance, 
the other provisions require a competitive effects test, usually a determination 
of “substantial prevention or lessening of competition.” The difficulty, even 
with the assistance of the IPEGs and Hypothetical Examples (which are non-
binding and often phrased tentatively) is that the central issues of market 
definition, market power, entry barriers, and deficiencies are difficult to 
apply to IPR cases. The question left by the IPEGs is whether they provide 
sufficient guidance regarding the application of these tests and concepts to 
specific IP licensing practices. 
VI. THE JAPANESE GUIDELINES FOR PATENT AND KNOW-HOW LICENSING 
AGREEMENTS UNDER THE ANTIMONOPOLY ACT 
A. Historical Background 
1. The 1968 Guidelines 
In 1968, the JFTC published its first guidelines on the application of the 
Antimonopoly Act to IPRs.367 They constituted one of two sets of guidelines 
implementing Section 6 of the Antimonopoly Act,368 which provides: “No 
firm shall enter into an international agreement or an international contract 
that contains such matters as constitute unreasonable restraint of trade or 
 365. IPEGs, supra note 3, § 4.1.  
 366. Id. § 2.3. 
 367. Antimonopoly Act Guidelines for International Licensing Agreements, supra note 280. 
 368. The other set was the Antimonopoly Act Guidelines for Sole Import Distributorship 
Agreements (Yunyû Sôdairiten Keiyaku tô ni okeru Fukouseina Torihikihôhô ni kansuru Nintei Kijun) 
(1972), reprinted in KAWAI, supra note 280, at 262. 
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unfair trade practices.”369 
Until it was repealed in 1997, Section 6, Paragraph 2 required that all 
international agreements that included license agreements of IPRs between 
Japanese and foreign firms be reported to, and be reviewed, by the JFTC. 
The Guidelines were meant to indicate standards of review under this article, 
not the general treatment of IPRs under the Antimonopoly Act. A 
commentary to the Guidelines states that their aim is “to protect Japanese 
licensees that had little bargaining power against foreign (American or 
European) licensors and were more often than not forced to accept 
disadvantaged terms of agreement.370 After discontinuing advance 
examination of international technology transfer agreements under the Act on 
Foreign Investment (Gaishi ni kansuru Hôritsu) in 1968, the review by the 
JFTC was expected to screen terms that were unfairly advantageous to 
foreign licensors.371 The concept was understandable, considering that Japan 
still was importing technology more than exporting it at the end of the 1960s. 
The scope of the Guidelines was limited in order to be suitable for this 
purpose. First, the Guidelines were to be applied only to agreements that 
import technologies into Japan; that is, where the licensor was a foreign firm 
and the licensee was a Japanese one.372 Second, the Guidelines concerned 
only unfair trade practices and not unreasonable restraints of trade, although 
both of these belonged to the subject of regulation under Section 6 of the 
Antimonopoly Act. This difference was because the main concern of the 
Guidelines lay in correcting disparities between the parties’ bargaining 
power.373 Third, not every kind of enforcement of IPRs was covered. The 
Guidelines confined themselves to license agreements of patents, utility 
models374 or know-how, which were the main subjects of technology transfer 
agreements at that time. 
The 1968 Guidelines listed nine types of clauses that were “liable to come 
under unfair trade practices” and five that were “regarded as the exercise of 
rights under the Patent Act or the Utility Model Act” and, therefore, exempt 
from the Antimonopoly Act. The former nine, although claimed not to be 
 369. Antimonopoly Act § 6. 
 370. KAWAI, supra note 280, at 7. 
 371. Id. at 69-73 (describing the background of publication of the 1968 Guidelines). 
 372. This limitation was indicated in the Japanese title of the Guidelines, which referred to gijutsu 
dônyû keiyaku, or agreements to import technologies, though the English translation was not clear on 
this point, employing a term “international licensing agreements.” 
 373. See KAWAI, supra note 280, at 44 (arguing that the most relevant type of unfair trade practice 
is the abuse of a dominant bargaining position). 
 374. The Japanese Guidelines use the term “patent” to include utility models.  
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illegal per se, very rarely passed the review by JFTC.375 Two of the most 
important of them were the grant back clause and the restriction on trading 
competing goods. 
2. The 1989 Guidelines 
The JFTC’s policies toward the interface between IPRs and the 
Antimonopoly Act changed radically in 1989. In 1989, the JFTC replaced the 
old guidelines with entirely new guidelines called the Guidelines for the 
Regulation of Unfair Trade Practices with Respect to Patent and Know-how 
Licensing Arrangements.376 Reflecting the growth of Japanese industry 
during the 1970s and 1980s, the review under Section 6(2) of the 
Antimonopoly Act had lost much of its meaning. The 1982 amendment to 
that provision lifted the reporting obligations on international agreements 
except for a few types of agreements listed in the JFTC rules. As a result of 
these developments, the new guidelines aimed at giving guidance concerning 
the application of Section 19 of the Antimonopoly Act (prohibition of unfair 
trade practices) rather than that of Section 6. They now covered license 
agreements of IPRs in general, regardless of the nationalities of the parties to 
the agreement. 
More impressive was the change in the substance of the Guidelines. The 
Guidelines pronounced that technology transfer agreements should be 
promoted as long as they have a positive effect on competition. 
[T]echnology transactions could have a procompetitive effect when, as 
a result of technology transactions, new business entities can enter a 
market, when the number of competing entities increases, or when the 
technology can be utilized more efficiently. Therefore, transfer of 
technology should be promoted, and it is expected that transfer of 
technology could be promoted through clarification of examining 
standards by way of guidelines.377 
 375. See KAWAI, supra note 280, at 172-73 (though claiming that the Guidelines did not intend to 
be rules of illegal conduct per se, Kawai argues that those terms that are liable to come under the 
unfair trade practices in the Guidelines have little prospect to be justified because the Guidelines have 
taken into consideration most of the possible justifications). 
 376. Guidelines for the Regulation of Unfair Trade Practices with Respect to Patent and Know-
How Licensing Agreements (Feb. 15, 1989), reprinted in Roger D. Taylor et al., A Comparison of 
International Intellectual Property Licensing Guidelines in the United States and Japan, 9 UCLA 
PAC. BASIN L.J. 104 app. 2, at 145 (1991). 
 377. Id., pmbl., para. 3.  
 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol1/iss1/15
p323 Neilson book pages.doc  10/15/02  11:51 AM 
 
 
 
 
 
2002] INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND COMPETITION LAW 397 
 
 
 
 
 
This passage implied, according to the commentary to 1989 Guidelines 
written by officials of JFTC, that the JFTC was prepared to admit such 
restrictive clauses as would provide appropriate incentives to licensors to 
enter license agreements, instead of regarding every restriction as harmful.378 
Put another way, the 1989 Guidelines, unlike their predecessors, did not 
presume that a licensor had stronger bargaining power than a licensee. It was 
now recognized that the relationship between a licensor and a licensee should 
be analyzed on a case-by-case basis.379 
Case-by-case analysis, however, can be rather formalistic. Apparently 
influenced by European regulation on license agreements at that time,380 the 
1989 Guidelines listed conceivable terms of license agreements and 
categorized them into “white,” “gray” and “black,” or, more precisely, 
“restrictions which are considered, in principle, not to fall under unfair trade 
practices,” “restrictions which may fall under unfair trade practices,” and 
“restrictions which are highly likely to fall under unfair trade practices.” 
The shift of policy was substantive and not merely a change of wording. 
In 1995, the JFTC took action against Japanese licensors, alleging that they 
committed unfair trade practices by urging a licensee in Taiwan not to export 
products to Japan after the termination of know-how license agreements. The 
cases resulted in Kankoku Shinketsu (a kind of consent decree),381 exhibiting 
that the use of IPRs would be attacked under the Antimonopoly Act even in 
cases where the licensors were Japanese firms. 
B. The Present Guidelines 
In 1999, the JFTC published the most recent guidelines, the “Guidelines 
for Patent and Know-how Licensing Agreements Under the Antimonopoly 
Act” (GPLAs),382 taking into consideration all recent developments. Since 
the reporting obligations and the review of international agreements were 
repealed entirely in 1997, the instrument is no longer a reference regarding 
Section 6 of the Antimonopoly Act. On the other hand, the aims of the 
 378. AKINORI UESUGI, Q & A TOKKYO/KNOW-HOW LICENSE KEIYAKU TO KYODOKENKYU 
KAIHATSU [Q & A ON PATENT AND KNOW-HOW LICENSING AGREEMENTS AND JOINT RESEARCH AND 
DEVELOPMENT] 68 (1993). 
 379. Id. at 78. 
 380. Commission Regulation (EEC) No. 2349/84 of 23 July 1984 on the application of Article 85 
(3) of the Treaty to certain categories of patent licensing agreements, [1984] O.J. L219/15; 
Commission Regulation (EEC) No. 556/89 of 30 November 1988 on the application of Article 85 (3) 
of the Treaty to certain categories of know-how licensing agreements, [1989] O.J. L161/1. 
 381. In re Asahi Denka Kogyo KK, 42 SHINKETSUSHŪ 163 (JFTC, 13 Oct. 1997); In re Oxylan 
Kagaku KK, 42 SHINKETSUSHŪ 166 (JFTC, 13 Oct. 1997). 
 382. GPLAs, supra note 4. 
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GPLAs were extended to include providing guidance under Section 3 of the 
Antimonopoly Act (prohibition of private monopolization and unreasonable 
restraint of trade) in addition to Section 19 (prohibition of unfair trade 
practices), which was addressed by its predecessors. 
The GPLAs no longer confine themselves to the analysis of restrictive 
terms that are likely to accompany license agreements.383 In addition, they 
refer to the exercise of other IPRs, recognizing that “problematic conduct 
from the viewpoint of the Antimonopoly Act is not necessarily limited to 
[restrictive terms of license agreements], but may arise from any situation 
that restricts the business activities of the other party through artificial means 
or methods.”384 
At first glance, the GPLAs appear to retain the approach of the 1989 
Guidelines, categorizing typical contractual terms into “white,” “gray” or 
“black.” They list conceivable clauses in license agreements and conclude 
analysis of each of them with one of the following three phases: (1) “will in 
principle fall within the category of unfair trade practices and be in 
violation;” (2) “in certain circumstances will fall within the category of unfair 
trade practices and be in violation;” or (3) “will not, in principle, fall within 
the category of unfair trade practices.”385 Thorough examination reveals that 
most of the clauses fall into the second category, which requires an analysis 
under the rule of reason. The 1999 GPLAs depart from the formalistic 
approach of the 1989 version and adopt the rule of reason approach in the 
true sense, just as their counterparts did in the United States386 and Canada.387 
Notwithstanding these signs of convergence toward globally recognized 
rules on the IPR/competition law interface, the GPLAs still retain one 
limitation on their scope of application: they are confined to analysis of 
patents, utility models, and know-how. They do not include copyrights or 
any other kind of IPRs, although the GPLAs will be applied mutatis 
mutandis to the latter.388 
 383. See id. pts. 2(1), 3.  
 384. Id. pts. 1, 3(1). 
 385. Id. pts. 1, 2(1). Under the category, there is a subcategory with the remark “highly likely to 
fall within the category of unfair trade practices and be in violation,” which is sometimes called “gray-
black.” Id. 
 386. U.S. Guidelines, supra note 5. 
 387. IPEGs, supra note 3. 
 388. GPLAs, supra note 4, pts. 1, 3(1). 
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1. Exemption for the Exercise of IPRs 
As noted above,389 the Antimonopoly Act provides that “[t]he provisions 
of this Act shall not apply to such acts recognizable as the exercise of rights 
under the Copyright Act, the Patent Act, the Utility Model Act, the Design 
Act or the Trademark Act.”390 Following the attempts of commentators to 
limit this provision to conduct involving IPRs and the Antimonopoly Act, the 
GPLAs adopt a functional test similar to the deviation theory.391 The GPLAs 
now state: 
Section 23 [renumbered as 21 in 2000] is viewed as having been 
enacted for the purpose of confirming that (1) “Acts recognizable as 
the exercise of rights” under the Patent Act, etc., are not subject to the 
Antimonopoly Act and shall not constitute a violation of the 
Antimonopoly Act; but that (2), on the other hand, even if acts are 
considered to be the “exercise of rights” under the Patent Act, etc., if 
the said acts are considered to deviate from or run counter to the 
purposes of the IPR system to, among other things, encourage 
innovation, the said acts are . . . no longer be deemed “acts 
recognizable as the exercise of rights” and the Antimonopoly Act shall 
be applicable to them.392 
In this passage, the GPLAs provide that conduct involving an IPR must 
satisfy two requirements in order to be granted an exemption. First, the 
conduct in question must be an “act considered to be the exercise of an IP 
right.” This is to be determined formalistically, that is, according to the types 
of conduct. Second, the conduct must not deviate from or run counter to the 
purposes of the IPR system. Because a principal purpose of the IPR system is 
to encourage innovation, the second part of the test may be restated as a 
determination of whether or not the conduct will stifle, rather than promote, 
technological innovation. 
2. Unreasonable Restraints of Trade 
Having confirmed that license agreements of patents are not particularly 
suspicious under the Antimonopoly Act, the GPLAs mention two primary 
cases that constitute an unreasonable restraint of trade prohibited by 
 389. See supra text accompanying notes 278-79. 
 390. Antimonopoly Act § 21. 
 391. See supra text accompanying note 279. 
 392. GPLAs, supra note 4, pt. 2.  
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Section 3 of the Act.393 One is the case in which “a licensing agreement for 
patents, etc., imposes mutual restrictions [on the parties to the agreement] 
regarding the sales price, manufacturing volume, sales volume, sales outlets, 
sales territories, etc., of the patented products, etc., and substantially restricts 
competition in a market for particular products.”394 The other case is where 
“restrictions are mutually imposed regarding the fields of research and 
development, the parties to whom the license may be granted, the technology 
used, etc., and these restrictions substantially restrict competition in a market 
for particular products or particular technologies.”395 
Although these situations may arise in any ordinary license agreement 
between two parties, the GPLAs identify three types of conduct that 
“particularly” must be explored.396 These are: cross-licensing among several 
patent holders, multiple licensing between a patent holder and many 
licensees, and organizing a patent pool into which several patent holders 
contribute their patents.397 
3. Private Monopolization 
The GPLAs identify three circumstances under which the exercise of a 
patent can constitute private monopolization.398 These are: a patent pool, 
concentration of many patents in one firm’s hands, and monopolization 
through restrictive terms of a license.399 
According to the GPLAs, anticompetitive effects may occur where there 
exists a patent pool and “if the right holders [that are members of it] refuse to 
grant licenses to new entrants or to particular existing entrepreneurs without 
justifiable reasons, or take other measures that have the effect of impeding 
the entry of other firms or of making it difficult for existing firms to conduct 
business.”400 Virtually the same situation may arise  
if right holders competing in a market for particular products cross-
license among themselves the patents, etc., that are essential to 
business activities in the particular field of trade, as well as all existing 
and future improvements to the technology, etc., and refuse to grant 
 393. Id. pt. 3.2(1). 
 394. Id. 
 395. Id.  
 396. Id. pt. 3.2(2).  
 397. Id.  
 398. Id. pt. 3.3. Though not stated explicitly, the examples probably are intended only as 
illustrations.  
 399. Id. pt. 3.3(1).  
 400. Id.  
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licenses without justifiable reasons to new entrants or particular 
existing firms, or take other measures that have the effect of impeding 
the entry of other firms or of making it difficult for existing firms to 
conduct business.401 
Regarding the concentration of patents in one firm’s hand, the GPLAs are 
concerned with a situation where a firm has “concentrate[d] patents, etc. 
relevant to a particular product field by acquiring the patents, etc. from other 
firms even when they are not particularly necessary for the firm’s own use” 
and refuses to license an acquired patent or enforces its patent by 
infringement suit with the aim of impeding new entrance into the market.402 
The terms of a license agreement, which were the sole subject of analysis 
in the 1968 and 1989 Guidelines, are still discussed mainly in relation to the 
prohibition of unfair trade practices.403 However, the GPLAs say that terms 
also can constitute private monopolization in some cases. Specifically, it 
refers to the situation where a de facto standard combined with a tie-in 
arrangement has the effect of excluding competing firms.404 
[T]here may be situations in [which] because a patent, etc. has become 
a de facto standard for the particular products and therefore has 
become essential to business activities in the field, it becomes difficult 
to conduct business activities in a particular product field without 
obtaining licenses under the relevant patents, etc. In this case, it will 
be illegal under the Antimonopoly Act as private monopolization 
where a licensor excludes or controls the business activities of other 
firms, including licensees, by imposing restrictions, such as making it 
obligatory for the licensee to procure products and technology 
designated by the licensor and thereby excluding the business 
activities of firms which manufacture products competing with the 
said designated products, if these acts substantially restrict competition 
in a market for particular products or particular technologies.405 
 401. Id. pt. 3.3(1). 
 402. Id. pt. 3.3(2). 
 403. Id. pt. 3.3(3).  
 404. Id.  
 405. Id.  
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4. Unfair Trade Practices 
Part 4 of the GPLAs is a successor to the 1989 Guidelines because it 
comments on some of the conceivable license agreement covenants.406 The 
covenants are divided into four groups: restrictions on the scope of license, 
obligations of the licensee that directly relate to the license of patents and 
know-how,407 obligations of the licensee with regard to the manufacture of 
patented goods, and obligations of the licensee regarding the sale of patented 
goods. 
Covenants in the first group, including restrictions on the permitted types 
of conduct (manufacture, use or sale), term, territory or field of technology, 
are not regarded as unfair trade practices. This is because they fall under 
“acts considered to be exercises of IP rights” and they usually have only 
negligible effects on competition.408 It is not clear why the GPLAs so easily 
disregard the possibility that the exercise of these IPRs deviates from or runs 
counter to the purposes of IPR systems by asserting (without any basis) that a 
possible anticompetitive effect is “negligible.”409  
As to covenants on grant-back obligations, which were a focus of the 
JFTC’s enforcement in the 1970s, those restricting the licensee’s use of the 
licensed technology, imposing an obligation on the licensee to pay royalties 
after the expiration of a licensed patent,410 or restricting the licensee’s 
research and development activities411 are regarded as “highly likely to fall 
within the category of unfair trade practices and be a violation of the 
Antimonopoly Act.” In contrast, an obligation on the licensee to inform the 
licensor about acquired knowledge and experience,412 to use best efforts for 
exploitation,413 or to maintain confidentiality in the case of know-how 
licenses414 “will not, in principle, fall within the category of unfair trade 
practices.”  
As to covenants on grant-back obligations, which are one of the focuses 
of the JFTC’s enforcement, the GPLAs distinguish between an obligation to 
assign, or grant the exclusive license of the licensor’s innovations on the one 
hand, and an obligation to grant a non-exclusive license on the other. 
 406. See id. pt. 4.  
 407. Part 4.3 of the GPLAs describes them as “restrictions and obligations accompanying 
licensing.” 
 408. Id. pt. 4.2(1). 
 409. The original Japanese for “negligible” in the English version is “chiisai,” or “small.” 
 410. Id. pt. 4.3(2)b. 
 411. Id. pt. 4.3(5)a. 
 412. Id. pt. 4.3(5)b(c). 
 413. Id. pt. 4.3(7)a. 
 
 414. Id. pt. 4.3(7)b. 
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According to the GPLAs, only the former type of a grant-back covenant “is 
highly likely to fall within the category of unfair trade practices and be in 
violation of the Antimonopoly Act,”415 whereas the latter joins those 
covenants subject to rule of reason analysis.416  
Other types of covenants, including royalties calculated on the basis of 
production volume,417 packaged licenses of multiple patents,418 no-contest 
clauses,419 and clauses that entitle the licensor to terminate the license 
agreement unilaterally420 will, in most cases, be analyzed under the rule of 
reason approach, or, in the words of the GPLAs, “constitute unfair trade 
practices if they have adverse effects on competition.” 
Most of the licensee’s obligations belong in the third group, including 
restrictions on production volume and frequency of use, competing goods 
and technologies, purchase of inputs such as materials or components, as 
well as the quality of the patented goods and/or inputs. These are analyzed 
under the rule-of-reason, except for clauses providing for a minimum 
production volume, which do not constitute unfair trade practices,421 and 
restrictions on competing goods or technologies after the termination of the 
license agreements, which are likely to constitute unfair trade practices.422  
Regarding the covenants included in the fourth group, the GPLAs rely on 
a policy similar to that indicated in Part 2 of the Guidelines Concerning 
Distribution Systems and Business Practices.423 In principle, restrictions on 
sale prices, including resale prices, constitute unfair trade practices.424 Non-
price restrictions, on the other hand, like restrictions on sales volume, 
customers, sales of competing goods, and obligations to use certain 
trademarks, are analyzed under the rule of reason approach.425 
 415. Id. pt. 4.3(5)b(a). 
 416. Id. pt. 4.3(5)b(b)a. 
 417. Id. pt. 4.3(2)a. 
 418. Id. pt. 4.3(3). 
 419. Id. pt. 4.3(4). 
 420. Id. pt. 4.3(7)c. 
 421. Id. pt. 4.4(2)a. 
 422. Id. pt. 4.4(3)a. 
 423. Japan Fair Trade Comm’n, Ryûtsû Torihiki kanko ni Kansuru Dokusenkinshihojõ no Shishin 
[Guidelines Concerning Distribution Systems and Business Practices] (July 11, 1991), available at 
http://www.jftc.go.jp. 
 424. GPLAs, supra note 4, pt. 4.5(2). 
 425. Id. pt. 4.5(3). 
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VII. A COMPARATIVE SUMMARY OF THE CANADIAN AND JAPANESE 
GUIDELINES 
A. Convergence of Basic Policy 
The Japanese and Canadian guidelines regarding the exercise of IPRs 
share a common philosophy and approach. 
On a philosophical level, both countries’ guidelines take for granted that 
competition law and IPRs are complementary rather than antagonistic. 
Almost every advanced economy now recognizes this.426 As the Japanese 
GPLAs state: 
The legal framework to protect intellectual property rights such as 
patents (hereinafter referred to as the “IPR system”) is considered to 
have procompetitive effects, since it encourages firms to conduct 
research and development and can thus become an impetus for the 
development of new technologies and products using such technology. 
Moreover, transfers of technology, whether through licensing or 
otherwise (hereinafter referred to as “technology transactions”), by 
promoting the efficient use of technology through the combination of 
different technologies, creating new markets for new technologies or 
products using such technologies and promoting an increase in the 
number of competing entities, are also basically considered to have 
procompetitive effects.427 
Likewise, the Canadian IPEGs emphasize: 
IP laws and competition laws are two complementary instruments of 
government policy that promote an efficient economy. IP laws provide 
incentives for innovation and technological diffusion by establishing 
enforceable property rights for the creators of new and useful 
products, technologies and original works of expression. Competition 
laws may be invoked to protect these same incentives from 
anticompetitive conduct that creates, enhances or maintains market 
power or otherwise harms vigorous rivalry among firms.428 
Licensing is the usual method by which the owner of IP authorizes 
others to use it. In the vast majority of cases, licensing is pro-
 426. See supra text accompanying notes 49-52. 
 427. GPLAs, supra note 4, pt. 1.1.  
 428. IPEGs, supra note 3, pt. 1.  
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competitive because it facilitates the broader use of a valuable IP right 
by additional parties.429 
Concerning their practical approaches, the guidelines of both countries 
again follow almost the same path by admitting that IPRs do not necessarily 
require unusual treatment in their application to competition law. This 
approach originated in the U.S. Department of Justice/Federal Trade 
Commission Guidelines of 1995.430 As the Canadian guidelines state, “[t]he 
approach elaborated in this document is based on the premise that the 
Competition Act generally applies to conduct involving IP as it applies to 
conduct involving other forms of property.”431 
The Japanese situation is more complex, because Section 21 of the 
Antimonopoly Act grants an exemption to “acts recognizable as the exercise 
of IP rights.”432 However, the GPLAs, by adopting the functional test 
discussed above,433 provide a way to apply the Antimonopoly Act to IPRs in 
the same manner as ordinary property. 
B. Scope of Analysis 
While the Canadian Guidelines deal with all kinds of IPRs protected in 
Canada434 and discuss every type of exercise of them, the Japanese 
Guidelines confine their scope of analysis to license agreements of patents, 
utility models, and know-how. This is mainly because of Japan’s historical 
background explained above.435 However, note that the Japanese Guidelines 
claim that other kinds of IPRs will be treated similarly to patents and know-
how: 
These guidelines are not directly applicable as they are to the licensing 
of other forms of IPRs. However, since the nature of exclusivity of 
patents or know-how can be seen to differ from that of other forms of 
IPRs, the views stated in these guidelines will be applied mutatis 
 429. Id. pt. 4.1.  
 430. The U.S. Guidelines state that, “[a]s with other forms of private property, certain types of 
conduct with respect to intellectual property may have anticompetitive effects against which the 
antitrust laws can and do protect. Intellectual property is thus neither particularly free from scrutiny 
under the antitrust laws, nor particularly suspect under them.” U.S. Guidelines, supra note 5, § 2.1. 
 431. IPEGs, supra note 3, pt. 1. 
 432. See supra text accompanying notes 278-79. 
 433. See supra text accompanying notes 389-413. 
 434. The Canadian Guidelines state, “[i]n the Guidelines, IP rights include rights granted under 
the Copyright Act, the Patent Act, the Trade-Marks Act, the Industrial Design Act, the Integrated 
Circuit Topography Act and the Plant Breeders’ Rights Act.” IPEGs, supra note 4, pt. 2.1. 
 435. See supra text accompanying notes 387-88. 
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mutandis to the extent possible depending on the nature of such other 
IPR rights.436 
It is difficult to justify the exclusion of copyrights from the scope of the 
Japanese Guidelines, considering the present importance of copyrights, 
especially with regard to computer software. Quite understandably, the JFTC 
is preparing another set of guidelines for the exercise of copyrights.437 Yet, 
trademarks and other kinds of protected signs are so different from patents 
and other IPRs aimed at protecting inventions that it is doubtful whether they 
can be regulated as one. Competition policy on trademarks, as contrasted 
with that on patents, may need further exploration in another jurisdiction.438 
It is noteworthy that the Japanese Guidelines refer to the exhaustion 
doctrine of IPRs: 
[I]t is also necessary to take into account whether the rights have been 
exhausted . . . when the patented products are distributed lawfully 
according to the wishes of the patent holder, as far as the said patented 
products are concerned, in the domestic context, this is interpreted to 
mean that the patent rights have already achieved their objective and 
that the patent rights for the products have been exhausted. 
Consequently, restrictions on the sale of patented products that were 
once lawfully distributed according to the wishes of the patent rights 
holder are handled in the same manner as restrictions on the sale of 
products in general under the Antimonopoly Act.439 
These statements imply that competition policy, lato sensu, is achieved 
not only through the application of antitrust statutes, but also should be 
considered from a broader perspective,440 including doctrines of IPRs. What 
is important in this regard is the exhaustion of IPRs in the international 
context, on which the Japanese Guidelines, in the paragraph cited above, fail 
to address. 
The same considerations are relevant to any jurisdiction, including 
Canada. However, the Canadian guidelines do not mention any statute other 
than the Competition Act. 
 436. GPLAs, supra note 3, pt. 1.3(1).  
 437. See NIHON KEIZAI SHINBUN Apr. 8, 2001. 
 438. Some attempts to clarify the unique features of trademarks, as opposed to patents, are made 
in SOUICHIROU KOZUKA, BRAND KANRI TO HÔ NO KISEI [REGULATION OF TRADEMARK LICENSING 
THROUGH NON-TRADEMARK LAW] 17-37 (2001). 
 439. GPLAs, supra note 4, pt. 2.4. 
 440. See, e.g., Tadashi Shiraishi, Unfair Competition Law to be Adjusted by Competition Policy, 
in OECD ROUNDTABLE REPORT, supra note 7, at 289-93 (arguing that competition policy can be 
woven into interpretation of the Unfair Competition Act). 
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C. The “Mere Exercise” of IPRs 
The Canadian Guidelines distinguish between “the mere exercise of the 
IP right” and conduct that involves something more. For example, 
The circumstances in which the Bureau may apply the Competition 
Act to anticompetitive conduct involving IP or IP rights fall into two 
broad categories: those involving anticompetitive conduct that is 
something more than the mere exercise of the IP right, and those 
involving the mere exercise of the IP right and nothing else. The 
general provisions of the Competition Act address the former, while 
section 32 (special remedies) addresses the latter.441 
“The mere exercise of the IP right” is defined as the exercise of the 
owner’s right to unilaterally exclude others from using the IP. The mere 
exercise escapes from the Competition Act’s general provisions and is 
subject only to the special remedy provided in Section 32. The Guidelines, as 
discussed above,442 require a two step test to be met before enforcing the 
special remedy.443 First, there must be a substantial adverse effect on 
competition in a relevant market. This is satisfied by fulfilling the following 
two elements: “(i) the holder of the IP is dominant in the relevant market, and 
(ii) the IP is an essential input or resource for firms participating in the 
relevant market.”444 Second, invoking a special remedy against the IPR 
holder must not adversely alter incentives to invest in research and 
development. It is expected to be “the very rare circumstances” that this two-
step test is satisfied and a special remedy is invoked.445 
A question arises whether such special treatment of “the mere exercise of 
an IP right” conforms with the fundamental position that intellectual property 
is no different than other types of property, at least as regards the application 
of competition law. The possible reason for this is implicit in the last part of 
the two step test—incentives to invest in research and development. In order 
to avoid killing the incentives, the Canadian Guidelines require caution in 
applying the Competition Act to “the mere exercise of an IP right.” 
This accords with the Japanese Guidelines’ adoption of a functional test 
in Section 21 of the Antimonopoly Act—the provision granting an 
exemption to “the acts recognizable as the exercise of rights” under IP 
 441. IPEGs, supra note 3, pt. 4.2.  
 442. See supra text accompanying notes 312-20. 
 443. IPEGs, supra note 3, pt. 4.2.2. 
 444. Id.  
 445. Id. pt. 4.2. 
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statutes.446 The Japanese Guidelines, as discussed above,447 provide that the 
conduct at issue must meet the following two tests in order to qualify as an 
act recognizable as the exercise of an IPR. First, it must be “an act considered 
to be an exercise of an IP right,” and second, it must be an act that does not 
deviate from or run counter to the purposes of the IPR system.448 Among the 
purposes of the IPR system, encouraging innovation is referred to 
specifically in the Guidelines, implying that it should be the principal 
consideration.  
There are some minor points that may require further examination. First, 
the definition of the “act considered to be an exercise of an IP right” in the 
first test of the Japanese Guidelines seems to be wider in scope, including 
“restrictions on territory, duration or field of use of the license” besides 
“decisions to license or not to license a patent, or filing a suit demanding a 
suspension of violation of the licensor’s rights.”449 The former types of 
conduct are considered to be a partial license of the IPR and, therefore, are 
treated as an exercise of an IPR. However, it is not clear whether Canada’s 
competition law enforcement authority shares this idea. Second, the 
Canadian Guidelines state that the two-step test for invoking the special 
remedy will be satisfied in “the very rare case.” In contrast, the Japanese 
counterparts declare that “whether the patent holder, etc., exercises one’s 
own patent, etc., or licenses or does not license it (including granting an 
exclusive license) to another person, does not, in principle, pose a problem in 
itself under the Antimonopoly Act.”450 It is yet to be seen how actively the 
competition laws of both countries will be enforced against “the mere 
exercise of IP rights.” 
D. Anticompetitive Effects 
The Canadian Guidelines clearly state that “[a] transaction or conduct 
must create horizontal effects for the Bureau to conclude that it is 
anticompetitive.”451 The term “horizontal effects” is used in the Canadian 
Guidelines to indicate “consequences for firms producing substitutes or firms 
potentially producing substitutes.”452 
 446. Antimonopoly Act § 21. 
 447. See supra text accompanying notes 389-91. 
 448. GPLAs, supra note 4, pt. 2.2. 
 449. Id. pt. 2.1. 
 450. Id. pt. 3.1 (in relation to the application of unreasonable restraint of trade or private 
monopolization) (emphasis added). 
 451. IPEGs, supra note 3, pt. 5.3. 
 452. Id. pt. 5.2.3. 
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Horizontal competitive effects are, of course, also a main concern to the 
JFTC in enforcing the Antimonopoly Act. However, the Japanese Guidelines 
touch upon a different kind of consideration when they examine restrictions 
that are likely to accompany license agreements of patents or know-how: 
Regarding [such] restrictions, it is also necessary to examine them 
from the perspective of the abuse of dominant bargaining position 
(Item 14 of the General Designation), in addition to the perspectives 
stated [in Part 4 of GPLAs]. 
It is in principle possible that the restrictions [analyzed in Part 4 of 
GPLAs] can become problematic from the perspective of abuse of 
dominant bargaining position. In addition to these restrictions, other 
restrictions can be problematic from the perspective of abuse of 
dominant bargaining position. In these cases, Item 14 of the General 
Designation may be applicable in addition to each of the provisions of 
the General Designation mentioned in the views concerning particular 
restrictions below.453 
The phrase “in addition to” indicates that anticompetitive effects are 
regarded in this passage as different in nature from those discussed in other 
parts of the Guidelines. Though not explicitly stated, the Guidelines probably 
are referring to the need to correct disparities between the licensor and the 
licensee. It is clear that elements of the old Guidelines still remain, the 
principal purpose of which was to address these kinds of disparities. 
However, under the present Guidelines the rules are no longer protective of 
Japanese interests alone, and apply no matter what the nationalities of the 
relevant parties are. 
E. The Process of Analysis 
The Canadian Guidelines clearly state the process of analyzing the 
anticompetitive effects of the conduct at issue. The basic framework is 
described as follows: 
In general, the Bureau’s analysis for determining whether competitive 
harm would result from a particular transaction or type of business 
conduct comprises five steps: 
 453. GPLAs, supra note 4, pt. 4.1(2).  
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  identifying the transaction or conduct; 
  defining the relevant market(s); 
  determining if the firm(s) under scrutiny possess market 
power by examining the level of concentration and entry 
conditions in the relevant market(s), as well as other factors; 
  determining if the transaction or conduct would unduly or 
substantially lessen or prevent competition in the relevant 
market(s); and, 
  considering, when appropriate, any relevant efficiency 
rationales.454  
The Japanese Guidelines, on the other hand, do not provide sufficient 
information about the process of analysis, as indicated by the following 
passage. 
[I]n the event that a licensing agreement for patents, etc., imposes 
mutual restrictions regarding the sales price, manufacturing volume, 
sales volume, sales outlets, sales territories, etc., of the patented 
products, etc., and substantially restricts competition in a market for 
particular products, it will be illegal under the Antimonopoly Act as an 
unreasonable restraint of trade.455 
This passage seems tautological because no information is available about 
the process of determining whether or not the agreement in question 
“substantially restricts competition.” 
The same comment applies to each step to be followed in applying the 
competition law. For example, regarding the definition of the relevant 
market, the Canadian Guidelines are sufficiently informative: 
When the anticompetitive concern is prospective (that is, the conduct 
is likely to have a future anticompetitive effect), relevant markets are 
normally defined using the hypothetical monopolist test. 
When the anticompetitive concern is retrospective (that is, the conduct 
has already had an anticompetitive effect), applying the hypothetical 
monopolist test could lead to erroneous conclusions about the 
availability of substitutes and the presence of market power. 
Accordingly, the Bureau takes into account the impact of any alleged 
 454. IPEGs, supra note 3, pt. 4.1.  
 455. GPLAs, supra note 4, pt. 3.2(1).  
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anticompetitive conduct that may have preceded the investigation 
when determining the relevant market.456 
The relevant part of the Japanese Guidelines, though quite lengthy, 
provides less predictability than the Canadian counterparts, because of 
phrases like “there could be,” “sometimes also,” and “can be defined.” 
The method for defining a relevant technology transaction market 
does not differ from the method for defining a relevant product or 
service market. The product market is considered to be defined for 
each patented product and includes those other products which have a 
similar type of function or utility as such patented product. Since, 
depending on the content of the restrictions in a patent or know-how 
license, it is possible that there could be an effect on competition in the 
market for components and raw materials, etc., of the patented 
products, etc., or in the market for products that use the patented 
products, etc., the market for these components and raw materials, 
etc., of the patented products, etc., or the market for products that use 
the patented products, etc., is sometimes also identified. In addition, 
the technology market can be defined for each relevant licensed patent 
or know-how and includes those other technologies which have a 
similar function or utility.457 
The Japanese Guidelines are useful for finding the list of “dubious” 
conduct that is likely to be taken up in the context of IPR/competition 
interface. The predictability regarding such conduct is so great that firms can 
rely upon it as a kind of safe harbor rule.458 If previously unimagined conduct 
arose, however, the list would lose much of its significance, since lack of the 
analytical framework might make the conclusion unpredictable. On the other 
hand, the Canadian Guidelines mainly are focused on explaining the steps of 
analysis. Although this rendered the description less concrete and invited 
criticism by not providing “appropriate guidance,”459 it appears to have the 
flexibility to be applied to any kind of conduct, even that which was 
previously unimagined. 
 456. IPEGs, supra note 3, pt. 5.1.  
 457. GPLAs, supra note 4, pt. 1.2(2).  
 458. This seems to be the intent of the JFTC itself, judging from the official commentary to the 
GPLAs. See YASUTAKA YAMAKI, Q & A TOKKYO LICENSE TO DOKUSENKINSHIHÔ [Q & A ON 
PATENT LICENSING AGREEMENTS AND THE ANTIMONOPOLY ACT] 20 (Special Issue No. 59 of NBL, 
2000) (emphasizing that “no problem arises” as long as the firms comply with the Guidelines, since 
the JFTC will enforce the Antimonopoly Act in accordance with the Guidelines). 
 459. See supra text accompanying note 360. 
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VIII. CONCLUSION 
The emergence of IPRs as the major form of wealth in the information-
based economies of developed countries requires reconciliation between 
IPRs and competition law. Today’s global economy and the convergences 
effected by digitization further necessitate that such reconciliation be 
accomplished intra-jurisdictionally, perhaps as a step toward international 
regulation, harmonization, and comity. This study of IPRs and competition 
law attempts to recognize both of these features by comparing the ways in 
which Japan and Canada reconcile them. 
Theoretically, IPRs and competition law are complementary, each 
enhancing competition. The IPRs promote research, innovation and 
development, while competition law provides oversight of all economic 
activities. Canada and Japan’s respective regulatory agencies have 
formulated guidelines that seek to explain and, in some instances, illustrate 
with hypothetical situations, uses of IPRs that may infringe upon the limits of 
anticompetitive conduct designated by competition law. We analyze the 
situations in both countries in the context of their published guidelines and 
reported decisions. The conceptual reconciliation of IPRs and competition 
principles is achieved by distinguishing the mere use of the IPR from the way 
in which a business is operated with respect to that IPR. In effect, the 
business activity involving the IPR is an infringement of a category of 
anticompetitive conduct. It is described as involving “something more than 
the mere exercise” of an IPR. 
It is more difficult to determine the circumstances when a “mere exercise” 
of an IPR might, in itself, be anticompetitive. Such scenarios are unlikely, 
and indeed, are extraordinary. The Japanese Antimonopoly Act does not 
address this situation specifically. Canadian competition law, however, does, 
in Section 32, at least in a procedurally controlled manner. Nevertheless, this 
provision has not been utilized to date.  
Case 10 of the Canadian Guidelines illustrates a circumstance under 
which this provision may be invoked. It involves an IPR becoming a 
monopoly over a subject matter (or relevant market), this being broader than 
the exclusivity ordinarily encompassed within the IPR. This might occur 
when, for example, a “mere use” of an IPR (a refusal to license) establishes 
an “industry standard” that allows the IPR holder to control a relevant market 
in a product or process beyond the subject matter of the IPR itself. The 
European Union recognizes this potential and this Article refers to 
developments in the European courts and Commission that look to a 
remedial resolution under competition law when this situation occurs. These 
decisions provide useful examples in contexts that have yet to occur in both 
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Canada and Japan. 
This Article also discusses the nature and scope of IPRs in Canada and 
Japan. This is of considerable importance. Each category of IPR presents 
features that differ from those of other categories. Each includes limitations 
or boundaries that balance exclusivity and competition. Hence, IPRs are 
inherently limited, but arguably, only to an extent that encourages and 
ensures competitiveness through innovation, research and development. 
Therefore, if a particular IPR is anticompetitive, a more effective solution 
may be to amend the scope and application of the IPR rather than to invoke 
principles of competition law. This Article considers aspects of this 
dimension in the context of the 1998 OECD Roundtable Report. 
Finally, this Article discusses the importance of interpreting IPRs within 
confines appropriate to their existing nature and scope. This ought to be the 
very first step in any analysis of IPRs and competition law. An 
inappropriately extended IPR will almost certainly be anticompetitive, even 
apart from the principles of competition law. 
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